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INTRODUCTION
The Alaska Law Review’s Year in Review is a collection of brief summaries of
selected state and federal appellate cases concerning Alaska law. They are neither
comprehensive in breadth, as several cases are omitted, nor in depth, as many issues
within individual cases are omitted. Attorneys should not rely on these summaries as an
authoritative guide; rather, they are intended to alert the Alaska legal community to
judicial decisions from the previous year. The summaries are grouped by subject matter.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
Anchorage Board of Adjustment v. LBJ
In Anchorage Board of Adjustment v LBJ,1 the supreme court held that a road near
a school qualifies as an urban improvement area and therefore must meet urban collector
standards.2 In 2005, the Platting Board determined that a section of road adjacent to a
new school would have to be improved to meet standards similar to urban collector
standards.3 The Board of Adjustment reversed the Platting Board’s determination and
found that it was not supported by substantial evidence.4 The superior court reversed the
decision of the Board of Adjustment and reinstated the determination of the Platting
Board.5 The superior court reasoned that the only way to read the administrative record
was to conclude that the section of road was in an urban improvement area and to require
by operation of law that the road be improved to meet urban collector standards.6 The
superior court also found that the school board had supplied no reasonable basis to defend
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the Board of Adjustment’s decision.7 Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed, holding
that a road near a school qualifies as an urban improvement area and therefore must meet
urban collector standards.8
Doubleday v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission
In Doubleday v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission,9 the supreme
court held: (1) a fisherman cannot use the spoliation of evidence doctrine to shift the
burden of proof when he is unable to make a showing that records were lost due to the
fault of the state, and (2) he is required to exhaust his administrative remedies to
challenge the number of fishery permits issued by the Commercial Fisheries Entry
Commission (Commission) and could not be excused on grounds of futility.10
Doubleday’s applications for permits for two fisheries were denied by the Commission
because he failed to produce sufficient evidence of participation in either fishery.11
Doubleday argued that he could not meet the burden of proof because the state destroyed
or lost records necessary to prove his case, and therefore the spoliation of evidence
doctrine supplied a rebuttable presumption that the missing documents would have
established facts unfavorable to the Commission.12 The supreme court held that even if
the spoliation of evidence doctrine could apply to this type of case, Doubleday failed to
produce any evidence in support of the claim that the government destroyed records
negligently or intentionally.13 Doubleday’s claim that the Commission violated the
Limited Entry Act by incorrectly calculating the maximum number of fishery permits
was denied because Doubleday did not exhaust his administrative remedies.14 Affirming
the superior court, the supreme court held that: (1) a fisherman cannot use the spoliation
of evidence doctrine to shift the burden of proof when he is unable to make a showing
that records were lost due to the fault of the state, and (2) he is required to exhaust his
administrative remedies to challenge the number of fishery permits issued by the
Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission.15
Gottstein v. State, Department of Natural Resources
In Gottstein v. State, Department of Natural Resources,16 the supreme court held
that the department does not necessarily violate the due process rights of interest holders
in an oil and gas lease by refusing to hold a hearing before deciding an appeal of the
approval of a proposed plan of development.17 Interest holders in a Cook Inlet oil and
gas lease appealed three final agency decisions pertaining to their lease.18 The superior
court affirmed the agency decisions,19 and the interest holders appealed.20 In considering
7
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whether the due process rights of the interest holders were violated, the court noted the
Commissioner’s conclusion that all information consulted and relied upon was available
on the public record and that the interest holders did not subsequently object to this
conclusion or give notice of any specific disputed material facts.21 Affirming the superior
court’s decision, the supreme court held that a department does not necessarily violate the
due process rights of interest holders in an oil and gas lease by refusing to hold a hearing
before deciding an appeal of the approval of a proposed plan of development, and the
superior court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for trial de novo.22
Hymes v. Deramus
In Hymes v. Deramus,23 the supreme court held that a prison inmate is not
required to exhaust administrative remedies for a medical malpractice claim based on an
irreparable harm that cannot be corrected by the agency.24 Hymes was a federal prisoner
who was temporarily held at a state facility.25 He brought suit against the physician and
physician’s assistant at that facility, alleging several instances of medical malpractice that
caused him irreparable harm.26 The superior court granted the physician’s motion for
summary judgment, holding that Hymes had not exhausted administrative remedies
before bringing suit.27 The supreme court reversed and remanded, holding that one of
Hymes’s claims was not subject to the exhaustion requirement.28 Hymes was allegedly
prescribed a medication that caused him irreparable harm, and the supreme court
reasoned that the policy objectives of an exhaustion requirement are not advanced when
the error is completely in the past and the agency has no way of correcting it.29 Reversing
the lower court, the supreme court held that a prison inmate is not required to exhaust
administrative remedies for a medical malpractice claim based on an irreparable harm
that cannot be corrected by the agency.30
Kingik v. State, Department of Administration
In Kingik v. State, Department of Administration,31 the supreme court held that
determining whether there has been a procedural due process violation requires
considering the government’s interest, the private individual’s interest, and the risk that
the private individual will be erroneously deprived of her interest.32 Kingik’s husband
submitted an Application for Retirement Benefits to the Division of Retirement and
Benefits (Division).33 Kingik provided a notarized signature on the application
consenting to her husband’s choice of a retirement option that did not include spousal
20
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benefits after his death.34 After Kingik’s husband died, the Division discontinued benefits
to Kingik.35 The superior court upheld the Division’s denial of benefits.36 Kingik
appealed, arguing the Division violated her due process rights by failing to safeguard her
right to survivor benefits.37 The supreme court held that because the application’s plain
language was reasonably clear, an erroneous deprivation of survivor benefits was
unlikely; consequently, Kingik’s due process rights were not violated.38 The court further
held that Kingik’s waiver of survivor benefits was effective.39 Affirming the lower court,
the supreme court held that determining whether there has been a procedural due process
violation requires considering the government’s interest, the private individual’s interest,
and the risk that the private individual will be erroneously deprived of her interest.40
Nash v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough
In Nash v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough,41 the supreme court held that an
individual’s due process rights are violated when an agency, during an administrative
hearing, bars that individual from presenting witnesses and relevant, material evidence
that is essential for a fair trial.42 Nash entered a timber contract with the MatanuskaSusitna Borough (Mat-Su) on September 25, 1998, which they amended twelve times.43
On October 25, 2002, Mat-Su notified Nash that due to breach, his contract was
terminated.44 Nash appealed his contract termination with the local board of adjustment
and appeals.45 Nash inquired about bringing witnesses to support his appeal and was
informed that interested parties could testify, but only if they had testified previously.46
Because this was not an appeal from a previous hearing, Nash moved to have parties
speak on his behalf and sent the board a list of individuals for approval.47 He received no
response from the board and thus did not ask most of his witnesses to take time off to
attend the hearing.48 The board upheld Mat-Su’s termination of Nash’s contract, and
Nash sued Mat-Su in superior court inter alia for breach of contract.49 Nash argued that
his trial should be de novo because the board hearing was unfair and violated his due
process rights.50 The superior court, finding no due process violation, affirmed the
administrative agency’s decision.51 Nash appealed, and the supreme court found that
although due process in administrative hearings is not identical to court proceedings, it
34
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should still be consistent with the essentials of a fair trial.52 Reversing the superior court
and remanding for a trial de novo, the supreme court held that an individual’s due process
rights are violated when an agency, during an administrative hearing, bars that individual
from presenting witnesses and relevant, material evidence that is essential for a fair
trial.53
Pietro v. UNOCAL
In Pietro v. UNOCAL,54 the supreme court held that a Workers’ Compensation
Board must: (1) evaluate lay testimony and consider significant issues in order to
determine whether an employee has proven claims by a preponderance of the evidence;
and (2) must provide detailed reasons for its decisions.55 After working at a UNOCAL
plant where he was exposed to arsenic, Pietro developed peripheral neuropathy and
eventually skin cancer.56 Pietro asked for workers’ compensation benefits, which the
Workers’ Compensation Board denied after finding UNOCAL had presented sufficient
evidence to rebut the presumption of compensability.57 Pietro appealed the decision and
the supreme court found that UNOCAL presented sufficient evidence to rebut the
presumption of compensability and thus the Board did not err.58 However, the Board was
required to then weigh testimony to determine whether Pietro had proven his claim by a
preponderance of the evidence, which the court found the Board had failed to do.59 The
court also found the Board’s conclusory statement did not provide enough information to
assess its accuracy, as the Board did not give reasons to reject Pietro’s experts’ testimony
and placed too much reliance on a 24-hour urine test.60 Affirming in part and vacating in
part, the supreme court held that a Workers’ Compensation Board must: (1) evaluate lay
testimony and consider significant issues in order to determine whether an employee has
proven claims by a preponderance of the evidence; and (2) must provide detailed reasons
for its decisions.61
Smart v. State, Department of Health & Social Services
In Smart v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,62 the supreme court
held that: (1) the Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) must give adequate
notice of audit decisions and appeal periods; and (2) a DHHS promulgated audit protocol
was not a regulation under Alaska’s Administrative Policy Act (APA).63 DHSS audited
Smart, a care coordinator, for Medicaid overpayments.64 In June 2007, DHHS sent Smart
a final audit report indicating total DHHS payments during the audit; the letter failed to
52
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specify an overpayment and recoupment amount and Smart did not appeal.65
Subsequently, in August 2007, DHSS issued a notice of recoupment for $2,370 and
provided no opportunity for appeal.66 Smart filed a putative class action complaint
alleging that DHHS’s failure to promulgate its audit protocol violated the APA and that
DHHS violated due process by failing to provide an opportunity to appeal notices of
recoupment issued without support for the recoupment determination.67 The superior
court granted DHSS’s motion to dismiss, finding that Smart failed to file a timely appeal
with DHHS and thus failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.68 Smart appealed the
decision and the supreme court found that DHSS’s notice to Smart did not comply with
due process because the recoupment amount and the appeal period should have been
clearly stated in the same letter as a description of DHHS’s specific findings.69
Additionally, the supreme court found that the protocol DHSS used for the audit process
was not a regulation under the APA because it was a “statistically valid sampling
methodolog[y].”70 Reversing and remanding in part and affirming in part, the supreme
court found that: (1) the DHSS must give adequate notice of audit decisions and appeal
periods; and (2) a DHHS promulgated audit protocol was not a regulation under the
APA.71
Yost v. State of Alaska, Dep’t of Commerce
In Yost v. State of Alaska, Department of Commerce,72 the supreme court held that
a doctor’s civil action regarding her license application was properly treated as an
administrative appeal.73 Dr. Yost made a good faith answer to a licensing examination
question that actually proved to be misleading.74 During the course of the ensuing
litigation, the superior court converted her civil action to an administrative appeal.75 Dr.
Yost argued that the case was fundamentally about her contract and not properly
characterized as an administrative appeal.76 Because the case required the court “to
consider the propriety of an agency determination”,77 the supreme court held that the
action was properly treated as an administrative appeal, irrespective of the framing of Dr.
Yost’s argument in contract terms.78
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BUSINESS LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
Holmes v. Wolf
In Holmes v. Wolf,79 the supreme court held that when a court finds that a
corporation’s directors have breached their fiduciary duty, the shareholders are not
automatically entitled to an award of nominal damages.80 Holmes, a shareholder of
Lesnoi, Inc., joined as a plaintiff in a derivative shareholder lawsuit against three of
Lesnoi’s five directors.81 Holmes claimed, inter alia, that the directors had failed to
obtain and send out audited financial reports.82 The superior court concluded that the
directors had breached their fiduciary duty by failing to inform themselves about the
federal audit requirement.83 On appeal, Holmes argued that the superior court erred in not
awarding nominal damages after finding the directors had breached their fiduciary duty.84
Because the superior court found that the directors acted in good faith and in the interest
of Lesnoi, the supreme court held that failing to award nominal damages was not an
abuse of discretion.85 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that when a court
finds that a corporation’s directors have breached their fiduciary duty, the shareholders
are not automatically entitled to an award of nominal damages.86
CIVIL PROCEDURE
top
United States District Court for the District of Alaska
Dietzmann v. United States
In Dietzmann v. United States,87 a magistrate judge held that the U.S. Department
of Justice (DOJ) is not relieved from compliance with a previous order that required
representatives from both parties be present at a settlement conference.88 The judge
previously ordered that every party have a representative, with full authority to settle
claims, present at the settlement conference.89 Ten days before the conference, DOJ
stated that it would not have anyone in attendance with full authority to settle because
only high-ranking officials had that authority and requiring a high-ranking official to
attend would create a hardship.90 The court noted that DOJ had notice of the settlement
79
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conference.91 The court also noted that DOJ only cited its own regulations—not a
statute—for the proposition that only high-ranking officials have the authority to settle
large cases.92 The court concluded that it has the power to review DOJ’s regulations and
to require that someone with full authority to settle claims be present at a settlement
conference.93 Thus, the magistrate judge held that DOJ is not relieved from compliance
with a previous order that required representatives from both parties be present at a
settlement conference.94
Alaska Supreme Court
Anderson v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.
In Anderson v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.,95 the supreme court held that the
operator of a pipeline pump station was a “project owner” under the exclusive liability
provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act and was therefore immune from suit, but
that an offer of judgment in the amount of ten dollars was a nominal offer and did not
trigger the application of Alaska Civil Rule 68.96 Anderson was injured at work, received
workers’ compensation benefits, and filed a negligence action against Alyeska Pipeline
Service (Alyeska) under the theory that Alyeska was not a statutory employer and should
not be immune from suit under the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act.97 Alyeska
responded, highlighting 2004 changes to the exclusive liability provisions of Alaska’s
Workers’ Compensation Act that showed a strong likelihood that Alyeska would be
considered a “project owner.”98 Alyeska then made an offer of judgment for ten dollars,
which Anderson rejected.99 When the superior court dismissed Anderson’s claim,
Alyeska was granted attorneys’ fees.100 Anderson appealed the summary judgment and
the award of attorneys’ fees.101 The court found, based on the legislative history of the
2004 changes and the statutory definition of “project owner,” that Alyeska clearly met the
definition of “project owner” and was covered by the exclusive liability provisions of AS
23.30.055 and that the superior court was correct in granting summary judgment for
Alyeska.102 However, the court acknowledged, and left open, the “difficult hypothetical
examples” raised by Anderson about the potential for small businesses to abuse the
exclusive liability provisions through the use of contractors.103 Finally, the court held
that a ten-dollar offer, made at the outset of a case that presented a novel legal question,
did not serve the purpose of Rule 68 to encourage settlement and should be considered
nominal.104 The supreme court affirmed the superior court decision that the operator of a
91
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pipeline pump station was a “project owner” under the exclusive liability provision of the
Workers’ Compensation Act and was therefore immune from suit but reversed and
remanded the lower court’s Rule 68 attorney’s fee award, holding that an offer of
judgment in the amount of ten dollars was a nominal offer and did not trigger the
application of Rule 68.105
Angleton v. Cox
In Angleton v. Cox,106 the supreme court held that members of a nonprofit
organization did not have the right to bring a derivative action.107 Following suspension
of several members of various lodges, members of a fraternal organization brought suit
against other members asserting claims for breach of settlement agreement and a
derivative action on behalf of the organization.108 The superior court dismissed the
derivative suit.109 On appeal, the supreme court held the derivative action was
appropriately dismissed because Alaska law does not recognize a derivative right of
action for members of nonprofit organizations.110 Affirming the dismissal of the
derivative action, the supreme court held that members of a nonprofit organization did
not have the right to bring a derivative action.111
Armstrong v. Tanaka
In Armstrong v. Tanaka,112 the supreme court held that a balancing test is required
to weigh the parties’ interests and to determine whether stay is appropriate when an
individual facing criminal charges brings a civil action and either party requests a stay of
civil proceedings pending resolution of criminal charges.113 Tanaka reported Armstrong
to the police after Armstrong gave Tanaka’s son an explicitly sexual and violent book.114
The police obtained a warrant to search Armstrong’s home and workplace and eventually
charged Armstrong with several counts of felony possession and distribution of child
pornography.115 After criminal charges were filed, Armstrong initiated a defamation suit
against Tanaka.116 Armstrong refused to answer several deposition questions on the basis
that they violated his right against self incrimination and he moved to stay civil
proceedings pending the resolution of criminal charges.117 The superior court dismissed
the civil suit and awarded Tanaka attorneys’ fees.118 The supreme court held that
applying a balancing test best safeguards a criminal defendant’s right against selfincrimination and right to due process while maintaining a civil defendant’s right to
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defend himself.119 The court remanded the case and held that a balancing test is required
to weigh the parties’ interests and to determine whether stay is appropriate when an
individual facing criminal charges brings a civil action and either party requests a stay of
civil proceedings pending resolution of criminal charges.120
Berg v. Vandervest
In Berg v. Vandervest,121 the supreme court held that when a pro se litigant makes
a clear effort to comply with court procedure, the court has an obligation to inform him of
the procedural steps necessary to achieve his obvious objective.122 Due to a mistake in
Berg’s preparation of his 2007 taxes, the Child Support Services Division (“CSSD”)
complied with his request to submit a motion to modify his child support payments.123
Berg submitted a memorandum and affidavit in support of the motion, as well as a
motion to vacate his 2006 child support order.124 However, after receiving additional
information from Berg’s ex-wife, the CSSD withdrew its motion,125 and the superior
court took no further action on his memorandum and affidavit.126 The court considered
Berg’s motion to vacate as a relief from judgment.127 However, the court denied his
motion due to untimeliness.128 After the CSSD withdrew its motion, Berg had no vehicle
to achieve the payment modification himself.129 Since his submitted materials made it
clear that his goal was to modify his payments,130 and he was operating in good faith,131
the supreme court determined that the superior court should have either interpreted
Berg’s accompanying memorandum and affidavit in a way that would have survived the
withdrawal of the CSSD motion or provided him information about how to file his own
motion.132 Remanding, the supreme court held that when a pro se litigant makes a clear
effort to comply with court procedure, the court has an obligation to inform him of the
procedural steps necessary to achieve his obvious objective.133
Bolden v. State, Department of Corrections
In Bolden v. State,134 the supreme court held that because it was unclear whether a
prisoner’s claim was an administrative appeal or a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, the superior court erred in dismissing the claim without notice or an opportunity to
clarify the nature of the claim.135 Bolden, a prisoner at the Fairbanks Correctional Center
119
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(“FCC”), filed a grievance against the FCC asserting that his Eighth Amendment rights
had been violated when his toilet overflowed, ruining the cast on his injured leg, and he
was forced to remain in his cell overnight without getting a new cast.136 Bolden’s
grievance was denied by the FCC, as was his subsequent appeal to the Director of
Institutions.137 He filed a pro se claim with the superior court, which, sua sponte,
interpreted Bolden’s claim as an administrative appeal and dismissed it for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.138 On appeal, Bolden argued that the dismissal violated due process;
that the superior court did have subject matter jurisdiction, and that his treatment in his
cell did raise an Eighth Amendment constitutional issue.139 The court found elements of a
§ 1983 claim based on the Eighth Amendment, but it was unclear that this was what
Bolden intended because the superior court dismissed the action without affording
Bolden an opportunity to be heard.140 Reversing the lower court, the supreme court held
that because it was unclear whether a prisoner’s claim was an administrative appeal or a
claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the superior court erred in dismissing the
claim without notice or an opportunity to clarify the nature of the claim.141
Bradshaw v. State, Department of Administration
In Bradshaw v. State, Department of Administration,142 the supreme court held
that Alaska’s ten-year statute of limitations does not bar the Alaska Division of Motor
Vehicles (DMV) from charging a $100 statutory fee to reinstate a driver’s license.143
Bradshaw’s license was suspended in 1995.144 In 2007, Bradshaw applied to have his
license reinstated and the DMV charged him a $100 statutory reinstatement fee.145
Bradshaw sued, arguing that the ten-year statute of limitations barred the DMV from
charging the fee.146 The supreme court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the
State,147 holding that a government agency’s charging of a fee is not an “action for a
cause” subject to the statute of limitations.148 The court also held that the DMV properly
charged Bradshaw the fee because the statute applies to the status of suspension and not
the initial act of suspension.149 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that
Alaska’s ten-year statute of limitations does not bar the DMV from charging a $100
statutory fee to reinstate a driver’s license.150
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Hertz v. Carothers
In Hertz v. Carothers,151 the supreme court held that: (1) the execution of a
judgment is void if improperly served even when the debtor had actual knowledge of the
execution; and (2) section 09.08.030(f)(5) of the Alaska Statute does not conflict with
section 33.30.201(d) of the Alaska Statute.152 The state attempted to execute a judgment
for attorneys’ fees against Hertz, a state prisoner, by levying Hertz's prisoner trust
account.153 Hertz had actual knowledge of the execution and the state served Hertz with a
faxed copy of the judgment delivered by a prison guard.154 Hertz claimed he was
improperly served and that section 09.08.030(f)(5) was invalid.155 Alaska Rule of Civil
Procedure 4 governs personal service and requires service to be made by a peace officer
or a person specially designated to serve notice.156 The supreme court held that the
service violated civil rule 4, reasoning that strict adherence to the service rules was
needed to protect the due process rights of litigants and debtors even when the debtor was
not prejudiced by the error.157 Section 09.08.030(f)(5) explains that prisoners do not
receive protection from judgments that low-wage earners receive.158 Section 33.30.201(d)
provided for prisoners’ wages to be placed in a trust account for the primary purpose of
being available for prisoners.159 Section 33.30.201 also identified the protocol for how
prisoners’ wages should be disbursed, including for the execution of judgments.160 The
supreme court reasoned that both statutes accommodated the execution of a judgment
against prisoners’ trust account and thus do not conflict.161 Reversing the lower court, the
supreme court held that: (1) the execution of a judgment is void if improperly served
even when the debtor had actual knowledge of the execution; and (2) section
09.08.030(f)(5) of the Alaska Statute does not conflict with section 33.30.201(d) of the
Alaska Statute.162
Hertz v. State, Department. of Corrections
In Hertz v. State, Department of Corrections, 163 the supreme court held that the
Alaska Prison Litigation Reform Act (“APLRA”) did not violate due process when
barring an inmate’s claim for reinstatement of gate money.164 Hertz, a prisoner, filed a
complaint claiming that the department of corrections had violated a 1990 Final
Settlement Agreement (“FSA”) when it decided to stop paying “gate money” to all
prisoners upon release.165 The superior court denied his claim, finding that Hertz had
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failed to state a right to gate money as required by the APLRA.166 On appeal, Hertz
argued that the FSA was a contract which created a right to gate money and he demanded
continued prospective enforcement.167 The supreme court rejected Hertz’s argument and
affirmed the lower court, reasoning that it was not the intentions of the parties to
guarantee that all of the FSA’s provisions would continue indefinitely.168 Additionally,
the supreme court held that the APLRA’s termination of prospective enforcement did not
violate property rights.169 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that the
APLRA did not violate due process when barring an inmate’s claim for reinstatement of
gate money.170
Johnson v. Johnson
In Johnson v. Johnson,171 the supreme court held that it was improper to award
full attorneys’ fees in a divorce case when the former husband raised potentially
meritorious claims in several motions and did not act in bad faith.172 The lower court,
applying Alaska Civil Rule 82, awarded full attorneys’ fees to Ms. Johnson at the end of
the Johnsons’ divorce proceedings.173 Because Mr. Johnson’s claims were not completely
devoid of legal or factual merit, they did not support a finding that he made his motions
in bad faith.174 The supreme court held that it was improper to award full attorneys’ fees
in a divorce case when the former husband raised potentially meritorious claims in
several motions and did not act in bad faith.175
Krause v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough
In Krause v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough,176 the supreme court held (1) while
damages are not available for constitutional claims, declaratory or injunctive relief is an
appropriate and traditional relief from an unconstitutional statute, and (2) a motion for
leave to amend a complaint to apply equitable tolling should be granted unless the claim
is legally insufficient on its face.177 The Krauses objected to a decision made by the MatSu Borough that made access to and from their property difficult and dangerous.178 After
unsuccessful negotiations with the Borough and landowners, the Krauses filed a
complaint with the superior court alleging a violation of a Mat-Su Borough Ordinance
and violation of their equal protection and due process rights.179 The superior court
dismissed their constitutional claims, ruling that this claim is unavailable when there is
alternative relief, and it dismissed the rest of the claims as being time-barred.180 The
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Krauses then appealed.181 The supreme court reaffirmed the unavailability of a
constitutional claim for damages when alternative remedies are available, but reversed
the lower court’s ruling on declaratory and injunctive relief. It found these types of relief
are “traditional” and “particularly appropriate” where constitutional rights were allegedly
violated.182 The court also reversed the lower court’s denial of the Krauses’ motion for
leave to amend because leave should be freely given unless the amendment would be
futile.183 Reversing the superior court, the supreme court held (1) while damages are not
available for constitutional claims, declaratory or injunctive relief is an appropriate and
traditional relief from an unconstitutional statute, and (2) a motion for leave to amend a
complaint to apply equitable tolling should be granted unless the claim is legally
insufficient on its face.184
Law Project for Psychiatric Rights, Inc. v. State
In Law Project for Psychiatric Rights, Inc. v. State,185 the supreme court held that
a public interest law firm lacked standing to bring a suit on behalf of minors who were
compelled to take psychotropic drugs.186 The Law Project for Psychiatric Rights (LPPR)
filed suit against the State, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief regarding minors’
rights in compelled psychotropic administration.187 The State moved for judgment on the
pleadings and to stay discovery, arguing that LPPR lacked standing for failing to
“identify a single individual who has been harmed by the alleged violations.”188 LPPR
argued that it satisfied citizen-taxpayer standing.189 The superior court granted both of the
State’s motions, reasoning that LPPR “failed to establish any parent or guardian with a
legitimate grievance on behalf of their . . . child,” and awarded the State attorneys’
fees.190 The supreme court reasoned that LPPR did not establish standing because it had
failed to demonstrate that the issues raised were of public significance or that it was an
appropriate litigant.191 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that a public
interest law firm lacked standing to bring a suit on behalf of minors who were compelled
to take psychotropic drugs.192
Mat-Su Regional Medical Center v. Burkhead
In Mat-Su Regional Medical Center v. Burkhead,193 the supreme court held that
patients cannot assign their personal injury claims to health care providers so they may
not intervene or bring actions on behalf of patients.194 Burkhead was injured by Voss in a
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car accident and received medical treatment at Mat-Su.195 During the course of her
treatment, Burkhead signed consent forms assigning all her claims for payment against
third parties to the hospital, which also recorded a lien against Burkhead.196 Mat-Su then
brought an action against Voss to recover the cost of Burkhead’s treatment.197 The
superior court granted summary judgment against Mat-Su, holding that the lien remedy in
section 34.35.475 of the Alaska Statute was Mat-Su’s exclusive remedy in such
situations.198 On appeal, Mat-Su argued that assignation of personal injury claims was a
common law remedy for which it did not need statutory authorization199 and that
Alaska’s lien statute did not prohibit such assignations.200 The supreme court reasoned
that the legislature could have adopted a statutory assignment remedy as it did in other
areas of tort law but instead chose to create the lien remedy,201 and that if it did recognize
assignment of personal injury claims to healthcare providers, there would be an increased
risk of patients assigning their claims under duress or without informed consent.202 In
addition, assignments are less necessary because health care providers are still able to
collect money from their patients as creditors.203 Affirming the lower court, the supreme
court held that patients cannot assign their personal injury claims to health care providers
so they may not intervene and bring actions on behalf of patients.204
Mullins v. Local Boundary Commission
In Mullins v. Local Boundary Commission,205 the supreme court held that a
lawsuit seeking a stay of an election may be dismissed as moot when the result of the
election obviates the need for judicial review of the claim.206 In such cases, only
declaratory relief is available and relief is unnecessary because similar claims will
frequently receive judicial review.207 Mullins appealed a decision by the Local Boundary
Commission (“LBC”) approving a petition to incorporate and sought an injunction to stay
a public referendum necessary to certify the approval of LBC.208 The voters rejected the
proposed incorporation.209 Mullins appealed to the supreme court.210 The supreme court
found that, although the superior court abused its discretion by failing to grant Mullins
the full time period to which she was entitled to file her response to LBC’s motion to
dismiss, she was not prejudiced by the abuse because the superior court ultimately
considered her motion for reconsideration and because the supreme court reviewed her
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substantive objections de novo.211 The supreme court held that the election had rendered
her claims against LBC moot, and that the public interest exception did not permit the
court to rule here because any future misconduct by LBC would likely be challenged in
court.212 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that a lawsuit seeking a stay
of an election may be dismissed as moot when the result of the election obviates the need
for judicial review of the claim.213
Okagawa v. Yaple
In Okagawa v. Yaple,214 the supreme court held that, under Alaska Rule of Civil
Procedure 68, an award of attorneys’ fees based on reasonable hourly rates is permissible
even when a previous contingency agreement exists.215 Yaple won damages from
Okagawa in a tort suit and received attorneys’ fees based on an hourly rate under Rule
68.216 Okagama argued that Yaple was not entitled to attorneys’ fees because he had a
contingency fee agreement and that the fees were unreasonable.217 The supreme court
held that it is permissible to award attorneys’ fees even if a contingency fee agreement is
in place.218 The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
attorneys’ fees based on the nature and length of the case.219 The award should be based
on the value of the services rendered, not on a previous agreement.220 Affirming the
lower court, the supreme court held that, under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 68, an
award of attorneys’ fees based on reasonable hourly rates is permissible even when a
previous contingency agreement exists.221
Roderer v. Dash
In Roderer v. Dash,222 the supreme court held that dismissal, judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, and a new trial are inappropriate sanctions for a party that
failed to timely file an expert witness report where the violation was not willful, where
there was little resulting prejudice to the other litigant, and where the nonconforming
party ultimately filed the appropriate report.223 Dash sued Roderer for medical
malpractice.224 Roderer moved to dismiss when Dash’s attorney failed to file an expert
report by the pre-trial deadline, even though Dash’s attorney filed a “working draft” of
the report.225 The superior court denied the motion, but issued an order requiring Dash’s
attorney to pay a sanction.226 Dash was awarded damages; Roderer moved for judgment
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not withstanding the verdict and, in the alternative, a new trial.227 The superior court
denied these requests and Roderer appealed.228 The supreme court affirmed the denial
because it was not “arbitrary, capricious, manifestly unreasonable” or the result of an
“improper motive” and because the circumstances of the discovery violation were not
sufficiently extreme to warrant dismissal.229 The denial of Roderer’s motion for a
directed verdict was also upheld because Roderer’s counsel failed to move for a directed
verdict at the close of evidence, pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule 50(b).230 Affirming the
superior court, the supreme court held that dismissal, judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, and a new trial are inappropriate sanctions for a party that failed to timely file an
expert witness report where the violation was not willful, where there was little resulting
prejudice to the other litigant, and where the nonconforming party ultimately filed the
appropriate report.231
Schofield v. City of St. Paul
In Schofield v. City of St. Paul,232 the supreme court held that it is generally
acceptable to exclude the results of an investigation by the district attorney or Police
Standards Counsel, but it is an abuse of discretion to exclude statements made during the
course of an investigation that potentially go to the core of an individual’s claim.233
Schofield, a police officer in St. Paul, met with the Chief of Police after evidence arose
that he was married to two women.234 Because of the meetings, Schofield resigned.235 In
2006, Schofield filed suit alleging wrongful termination and constructive discharge.236
The jury found no constructive discharge.237 On appeal, Schofield argued that the
superior court improperly excluded the content of the meetings from evidence.238 The
supreme court reversed the lower court, reasoning that because Schofield had resigned
immediately after the meetings, the content was extremely relevant and the relevance
outweighed any potential to mislead.239 Furthermore, the court found that because
Schofield was alleging constructive termination stemming from the meetings, the content
could corroborate his key claim, and because admitting the content of the meetings did
not require admitting the results of the investigation, the exclusion was sufficiently
prejudicial to constitute a reversible error.240 The supreme court held that it is generally
acceptable to exclude the results of an investigation by the district attorney or Police
Standards Counsel, but it is an abuse of discretion to exclude statements made during the
course of an investigation that potentially go to the core of an individual’s claim.241
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Schug v. Moore
In Schug v. Moore,242 the supreme court held that discretionary acts made by the
assistant attorney general, while working within the scope of authority as assistant
attorney general, were protected by official immunity.243 Schug, after an unsuccessful suit
against the Alaska Department of Corrections (DOC) for alleged personal injury while in
DOC custody, filed a claim against Moore, the Assistant Attorney General, for “attorney
malpractice” stemming from her role as defense attorney for DOC in Schug’s case.244
Moore filed a motion for summary judgment, which the superior court granted on the
grounds that Moore had absolute immunity and that Schug’s claims were “unsustainable
as a matter of law.”245 The supreme court first determined that the complaints against
Moore involved actions taken by Moore in her official capacity as Assistant Attorney
General.246 The court then found that Moore’s actions were discretionary, thereby
triggering official immunity.247 Because Schug offered no evidence that Moore acted
“corruptly, maliciously, or in bad faith,” the court did not determine whether Moore’s
immunity was absolute or qualified.248 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held
that discretionary acts made by the assistant attorney general, while working within the
scope of authority as assistant attorney general, were protected by official immunity.249
Shooshanian v. Dire
In Shooshanian v. Dire,250 the supreme court held that: (1) refusal to grant a
continuance is valid when there is no “weighty reason” for a continuance; (2) it is not an
abuse of discretion when a court does not inform a pro se litigant as to each step in
litigating a claim; (3) an attorney is not a necessary witness at trial when his pretrial
involvement is not material to the disputed facts; and (4) a tenant may be evicted when he
has an option right to purchase the residence if a further contract is necessary to
accomplish the purchase.251 Shooshanian attempted to exercise an option right to
purchase a condo that he had rented for several years.252 In response, the property owner
informed Shooshanian the property price had increased and accordingly tried to collect
back rent.253 Nearly a year later, the owner attempted to evict Shooshanian, and the
matter was transferred to superior court because of Shooshanian’s assertion he held “two
option to buy leases.”254 Shooshanian’s motion for a continuance was denied, and
Shooshanian appealed when the superior court granted the owner judgment for
possession. Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that: (1) refusal to grant a
continuance is valid when there is no “weighty reason” for a continuance; (2) it is not an
242
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abuse of discretion when a court does not inform a pro se litigant as to each step in
litigating a claim; (3) an attorney is not a necessary witness at trial when his pretrial
involvement is not material to the disputed facts; and (4) a tenant may be evicted when he
has an option right to purchase the residence if a further contract is necessary to
accomplish the purchase.255
Smallwood v. Central Peninsula General Hospital, Inc.
In Smallwood v. Central Peninsula General Hospital, Inc.,256 the supreme court
held that the superior court is without jurisdiction to substitute parties or dismiss a case
while it is on appeal.257 The supreme court also held that a plaintiff does not abandon his
claim when he has won an injunction but fails to contest whether the defendant has
complied with the injunction.258 Smallwood won an injunction ordering Central
Peninsula General Hospital to stop “balance billing” Medicaid patients, but when the
hospital submitted an affidavit describing the procedures enacted to avoid balance billing,
Smallwood did not dispute the affidavit.259 The supreme court held that because
Smallwood already obtained an injunction, he did not abandon his claim merely by
failing to contest the hospital’s compliance with the injunction.260 Smallwood passed
away while the case was on appeal.261 The superior court dismissed the case because
another plaintiff was not substituted for Smallwood within ninety days, as required by
Alaska Civil Rule 25(a)(1).262 The supreme court stated that once a notice of appeal is
filed, the appellate court holds the “supervision and control” of the proceedings.263
Therefore, superior courts lack jurisdiction to order substitution of parties, or dismissal
due to the death of parties while cases are on appeal.264 Thus, the supreme court held that
the superior court is without jurisdiction to substitute parties or dismiss a case while it is
on appeal.265
State Dep’t of Corr. v. Anthoney
In State Department of Corrections v. Anthoney,266 the supreme court upheld a
superior court ruling that designated an inmate as the “prevailing party” in a litigation
because he prevailed on the main issue and affirmed the superior court’s award of costs
to the inmate.267 Anthoney, an inmate at Spring Creek Correctional Center (“SCCC”),
was involved in an altercation while working in the kitchen.268 Anthoney claimed before
the SCCC disciplinary committee that he did not strike the other inmate who was
involved in the incident and that security camera footage and eyewitness testimony would
255
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confirm his story.269 However, the committee did not review the footage or hear any
witness testimony and convicted Anthoney for “mutual combat.”270 Anthoney appealed
his conviction to the superior court and argued that he was convicted of a more severe
charge than the one of which he was actually guilty.271 The court reduced his conviction
to “using abusive or obscene language” and declared him to be the prevailing party in
addition to awarding him costs of $411.44 on his motion for the same.272 The State
appealed his designation as the prevailing party and the award of costs and argued that
Anthoney did not prevail on the main issue because he was still guilty of violating
correctional rules.273 The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s holding that a
prevailing party is the party that identifies and prevails on the main issue of the
litigation.274
Weimer v. Continental Car & Truck, LLC
In Weimer v. Continental Car & Truck, LLC,275 the supreme court held that the
statute of limitations of Alaska’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act
(UTPA) begins to run when the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered,
that the conduct in question caused a loss.276 Weimer brought a class action suit against
an automobile dealership more than two years after purchasing his car, alleging that the
dealership charged him a last minute preparation fee in violation of UTPA.277 The UTPA
statute of limitation provides that “[a] person may not commence an action under this
section more than two years after the person discovers or reasonably should have
discovered that the loss resulted from an act or practice declared unlawful by [UTPA].278
Although Weimer did not know that the dealership’s act was unlawful until after more
than two years,279 the supreme court held that the language of the statute made clear that
the limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should
have discovered, that the conduct in question caused a loss; the supreme court rejected
Weimer’s assertion that the statute of limitations begins to toll when a plaintiff learns that
the conduct was illegal.280 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that the
statute of limitations of Alaska’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act
(UTPA) begins to run when the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered,
that the conduct in question caused a loss.281
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
top
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Kirk v. Carpeneti
In Kirk v. Carpeneti,282 the Ninth Circuit held that the nomination of state judges
by a judicial council that is not popularly elected does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.283 In Alaska, judges are nominated by a council that
consists of the chief justice of the state supreme court, three lay members, and three
attorney members elected by the Board of Governors of the Alaska Bar Association.284
The plaintiffs alleged that the nomination of judges by a non-elected body violates the
Equal Protection Clause.285 The court reasoned that the Alaska Bar Association is a
“limited purpose entity” since it has no power to impose taxes or to enact laws,286 so its
elections are not governed by the Equal Protection principle that citizens must be able to
participate in elections on equal footing.287 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that the
nomination of state judges by a judicial council that is not popularly elected does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.288
Alaska Supreme Court
Croft v. Parnell
In Croft v. Parnell,289 the supreme court held that a ballot initiative that proposes
a new government program and a new tax violates article II, section 13 of the Alaska
Constitution when the only connection between the program and the tax is the “soft
dedication” of the tax to fund the program.290 The Lieutenant Governor denied
certification to a ballot initiative proposing: (1) a program that would provide public
funding to state office candidates and (2) a tax on oil that the legislature “may
appropriate” for the campaign finance program.291 The initiatives’ sponsors sued, and the
superior court granted summary judgment to The Lieutenant Governor.292 On appeal, the
sponsors argued that the initiative did not violate the Alaska Constitution’s single-subject
rule because the tax was calibrated to collect the amount of revenue necessary to fund the
campaign finance program and because there was a “soft dedication” of the tax to the
program.293 The supreme court reasoned that because article IX, section 7 of the Alaska
Constitution prohibits the binding dedication of state revenues for certain programs, a
282
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“soft dedication” of funds is not enough to unite two provisions of an initiative into a
single subject.294 Because there was no single subject embracing both the campaign
finance program and the oil tax, the certification was correctly denied.295 Affirming the
lower court, the supreme court held that a ballot initiative that proposes a new
government program and a new tax violates article II, section 13 of the Alaska
Constitution when the only connection between the program and the tax is the “soft
dedication” of the tax to fund the program.296
Kohlhaas v. State, Office of the Lieutenant Governor
In Kohlhaas v. State, Office of the Lieutenant Governor,297 the supreme court held
that a ballot initiative may be denied if it either seeks secession from the Union or a
change to the Alaska Constitution to allow secession.298 Kohlhaas proposed an initiative
seeking a statewide vote on whether Alaska should secede from the United States and the
lieutenant governor refused to certify it.299 Kohlhaas challenged the decision, and the
superior court held that the refusal was proper because secession is an unconstitutional
end.300 Kohlhaas drafted a second initiative calling for a statewide vote on whether the
Alaska Constitution should be changed to allow secession.301 The lieutenant governor
again refused to certify the initiative and the superior court affirmed the decision.302
Kohlhaas appealed and the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision on two
grounds.303 First, the state may deny a proposed initiative seeking unconstitutional ends
because Alaska is committed to an “indestructible Union” and to upholding the United
States Constitution.304 Because secession was at the core of Kohlhaas’s second initiative,
it too was unconstitutional and an “improper subject for the initiative process.”305
Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that a ballot initiative may be denied if
it either seeks secession or a change to the Alaska Constitution to allow secession.306
West v. State, Board of Game
In West v. State, Board of Game,307 the supreme court held that the “sustained
yield clause” of the Alaska Constitution and the “intensive game management statute”
require the Board of Game (Board) to apply principles of sustained yield when managing
predator species.308 West filed suit to challenge the Board’s 2006 predator control
plans.309 The supreme court first held that, based on the history and plain language of the
294
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sustained yield clause, the clause applies to both predator and prey species; however,
management preference to prey populations over predator populations is not
unconstitutional.310 Next, the court held that, based upon the text of the intensive game
management statute and the preference for statutory construction consistent with
constitutional principles, the sustained yield principle in the intensive management statute
applies to predator species.311 However, because the Board’s 2006 predator control plans
include safeguards to ensure that predator populations do not fall below certain levels,
West did not demonstrate that the plans fail to comply with constitutional or statutory
sustainable yield principles.312 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that the
“sustained yield clause” of the Alaska Constitution and the “intensive game management
statute” require the Board to apply principles of sustained yield when managing predator
species.313
Alaska Court of Appeals
Vann v. State
In Vann v. State,314 the court of appeals held that a lab technician testifying about
a genetic test performed in part by another technician does not violate the confrontation
clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution even though the other
employee did not testify.315 The state charged Vann with kidnapping and sexual
assault.316 Lab technician Duda testified for the state about the results of comparing DNA
samples from the victim and defendant against five DNA samples from items at the crime
scene.317 Duda tested three of the five samples, an associate, Cohen, tested two of the
samples, and Duda interpreted and verified Cohen's results.318 Vann objected to Duda's
testimony as a violation of his right to confront Cohen as a witness against him.319 The
trial judge overruled Vann's objection and held that Duda's testimony needed only to
fulfill the requirements for an expert testifying about another's work under Rule of
Evidence 703.320 In determining the extent that the confrontation clause limited an expert
testifying about another person's work, the court of appeals decided that an expert cannot
act as a mere conduit for another's opinion but can offer an independent analysis based in
part on another person's work.321 The court of appeals held that because Duda examined
Cohen's results and made an independent verification of Cohen's conclusions, Duda's
testimony about all five DNA samples did not violate Vann's right to confront witnesses
against him.322 Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals held that a lab technician
testifying about a genetic test performed in part by another technician does not violate the
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confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution even
though the other employee did not testify.323
CONTRACT LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
Commercial Recycling Center, Ltd. v. Hobbs Industries, Inc.
In Commercial Recycling Center, Ltd. v. Hobbs Industries, Inc.,324 the supreme
court held that a party to a contract cannot unilaterally rescind the agreement and a court
will not equitably rescind the agreement if the only remaining obligation is monetary.325
Austin and Lori Hobbs contracted with Tiplady and Cucullu to buy their Hobbs
Industries, Inc ("HIAK") shares.326 After the Hobbs failed to perform on their payment
obligations, Tiplady and Cucullu sent a letter purporting to rescind the contract and sold
their shares to Commercial Recycling Center ("CRC").327 CRC sought a court order to
establish its ownership interest in HAIK.328 The supreme court held that the letter
attempting to rescind the agreement was invalid because one cannot rescind a contract
unilaterally.329 It remanded for consideration whether there exists an equitable rescission
based on a breach of fiduciary duty.330 Equity demands a rescission when one party fails
to perform but will not grant the rescission if the only remaining performance is a
monetary payment, because the preferred outcome is a remedy for a breach.331 An
equitable rescission is available if a fiduciary induces a contract through unfair
persuasion.332 The supreme court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that a
party to a contract cannot unilaterally rescind the agreement and a court will not equitably
rescind the agreement if the only remaining obligation is monetary.333
Wenzell v. Ingrim
In Wenzell v. Ingrim,334 the supreme court held that while working as a dentist at a
federal nonprofit agency is “the practice of dentistry,” but it is a disputed question of fact
whether that practice violated a covenant not to compete.335 Ingrim sold his dental
practice to Wenzell and signed a covenant not to compete.336 The covenant stated that
Ingrim could not “engage in the practice of dentistry” within a fifteen mile radius for two
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years.337 Ingrim then began working as a dentist at the Alaska Native Medical Center
(ANMC), a federally-funded clinic providing free services to Alaska Natives, which was
located within fifteen miles of his former practice.338 Wenzell sued, claiming that Ingrim
had violated the covenant.339 The superior court held that Ingrim’s new position at
ANMC did not constitute the “practice of dentistry” based on Alaska Statute
08.36.350(a).340 On appeal, the supreme court re-examined the covenant terms and held
that the purpose of the contract was to prevent Ingrim from competing with Wenzell, not
to bar Ingrim from the practice of all dentistry.341 The supreme court also noted that the
superior court had misinterpreted AS 08.36.350, because Ingrim’s work constituted the
“practice of dentistry.”342 But the supreme court stated that when a party attempts to
enforce a covenant not to compete against a person employed by a federally-funded nonprofit organization offering low-cost services, competition is not presumed; it must be
proven.343 The supreme court then remanded to determine whether Ingrim’s practice
actually competed with Wenzell’s.344 The supreme court held that a dentist working for
the Alaska Native Service is “practicing dentistry,” and that it is a question for the factfinder whether this conduct violated a covenant not to compete.345
CRIMINAL LAW
top
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
United States v. Hunter
In U.S. v. Hunter,346 the Ninth Circuit held that ordering people convicted of mail
fraud to repay wages earned through employment obtained fraudulently was an
appropriate interpretation of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act.347 Hunter stole the
identity of a nurse in order to obtain a nursing license, which she used to obtain
employment as a school nurse and with the Department of Labor where she was paid
$12,558 and $5,457 respectively.348 Hunter was arrested, sentenced to ninety-six months
incarceration, and ordered to pay back the $12,558 and $5,457, which she appealed.349
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision, holding that the Mandatory Victims Restitution
Act “requires courts to order restitution to victims of certain criminal offenses, such as
mail fraud.”350 Loss is determined by comparing what would have happened if the
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criminal had acted lawfully and what actually happened.351 The employers paid for the
services of a registered nurse which they never received and loss requires no reduction
from all wages paid for the value of work Hunter performed.352 Affirming the lower
court, the Ninth Circuit held that ordering people convicted of mail fraud to repay wages
earned through employment obtained fraudulently was an appropriate interpretation of
the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act.353
United States v. Lozano
In United States v. Lozano,354 the Ninth Circuit held that: (1) evidence found in
probation and consensual searches was admissible as evidence of prior bad acts; and (2)
transporting a package from Barrow to Anchorage and detention of the same package for
twenty-two hours was reasonable.355 Lozano appealed his conviction of attempted
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute after a package sent to his P.O. box in
Barrow was found to contain eleven pounds of marijuana.356 The Ninth Circuit held that
cash and a photograph of Lozano at a marijuana “grow” were admissible under Rule of
Evidence 404(b) because evidence of Lozano’s prior possession or sale of drugs was
material to the charges and not too remote in time.357 The Ninth Circuit also held that the
decision to detain the package was reasonable because Lozano had earlier asked whether
mail could be searched for drugs and the package listed a fictitious sender and
addressee.358 Further, the delay was reasonable because it was less than one day and part
of the delay came from the remoteness of Barrow.359 Affirming the lower court, the Ninth
Circuit held that: (1) evidence found in probation and consensual searches was admissible
as evidence of prior bad acts; and (2) transporting a package from Barrow to Anchorage
and detention of the same package for twenty-two hours was reasonable.360
United States District Court for the District of Alaska
Stavenjord v. Schmidt
In Stavenjord v. Schmidt,361 a magistrate judge recommended the denial of a
prisoner’s habeas petition because the state court of appeals’ rejection of the prisoner’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not contrary to federal law and was not an
unreasonable application of federal law.362 Stavenjord was convicted of first-degree
murder.363 On appeal, his lawyers did not argue that that the police lacked probable
cause to substantiate search warrants of Stavenjord’s home.364 After reviewing the
351

Id.
Id. at 1064–65.
353
Id. at 1064.
354
623 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2010).
355
Id. at 1059–61.
356
Id. at 1058–59.
357
Id. at 1059–60.
358
Id. at 1060.
359
Id. at 1061.
360
Id. at 1059–61.
361
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71028 (D. Alaska July 14, 2010).
362
Id. at *7–*9.
363
Id. at *2.
364
Id. at *3.
352

26

record, the magistrate judge determined that Stavenjord’s appellate lawyers made a
strategic choice in their argument selection.365 The magistrate judge noted that attorneys
have the obligation to winnow out less meritorious claims on appeal.366 Because
Stavenjord did not identify acts or omissions by his lawyers that were outside the range
of competent legal assistance, the state court of appeals did not err when denying his
claim.367 Thus, the magistrate judge recommended the denial of a prisoner’s habeas
petition because the state court of appeals’ rejection of the prisoner’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim was not contrary to federal law and was not an unreasonable
application of federal law.368
U.S. v. Mujahid
In U.S. v. Mujahid,369 the district court held that the Anchorage Division’s jury
selection process did not violate constitutional or statutory law even though AfricanAmericans were underrepresented in jury pools.370 Mujahid, an African-American,
moved for an alternative jury selection process because African-Americans constitute
5.2% of the Anchorage Division’s population but only 2.06% of master jury wheels in the
district.371 He argued that the 60% comparative disparity violated constitutional and
statutory fair cross-section requirements, and that the jury wheels could be more
representative by using a different selection process.372 The court reasoned that district
courts must look at absolute disparities, not comparative disparities, and that an absolute
disparity of 3.14% is not sufficient to change the jury selection process.373 In addition,
reliance on voter lists is facially neutral and not susceptible to abuse.374 The district court
held that the Anchorage Division’s jury selection process did not violate constitutional or
statutory law even though African-Americans were underrepresented in jury pools.375
Alaska Supreme Court
Diaz v. State
In Diaz v. State,376 the supreme court held that an inmate in electronic monitoring
is still in custody and therefore complaints relating to custody and interrogation by
Department of Correction (DOC) officers should be examined under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and not the Fourth Amendment.377 While serving in an electronic
monitoring program, Diaz was accused of misconduct, taken into custody for
questioning, and eventually returned to jail.378 Diaz filed a § 1983 claim against the DOC
365
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for violating her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments during the
questioning.379 Because inmates in electronic monitoring are still considered in custody,
Diaz was in DOC custody when the officers picked her up.380 Accordingly, her
complaints are not evaluated under the Fourth Amendment, only under the Fourteenth
Amendment.381 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that an inmate in
electronic monitoring is still in custody and therefore complaints relating to custody and
interrogation by DOC officers should be examined under the Fourteenth Amendment,
and not the Fourth Amendment.382
Greenwood v. State
In Greenwood v. State,383 the supreme court held that a defendant arrested for
drunk driving is entitled to a jury instruction on the necessity defense as long as there is
some evidence that: (1) the defendant sought to prevent significant evil; (2) the defendant
reasonably believed there was no adequate alternative; (3) given the facts perceived by
the defendant, the harm avoided was not disproportionate to the harm caused; and (4) the
defendant stopped driving as soon as she reasonably believed the necessity ended.384
After drinking with Way, Greenwood overheard Way mumble that he was going to burn
down Greenwood’s camper and his parents’ home and leave no witnesses.385 Greenwood
witnessed Way throw candles inside her camper, hit her dog, and start driving around on
his four wheeler.386 In response, Greenwood called the police, drove to Way’s parents’
house, honked her horn in warning, and then drove to the main road to meet the police.387
The trial court refused to instruct the jury on the necessity defense, and Greenwood was
convicted of drunk driving.388 The supreme court reversed, reasoning that there was some
evidence showing that until Greenwood stopped to wait for the police, she saw driving as
the only way to prevent arson and physical harm to herself and Way’s parents.389 The
court further reasoned that because Greenwood took precautions, there was some
evidence that Greenwood’s drunk driving was relatively less serious than the harms she
sought to prevent.390 The supreme court held that a defendant arrested for drunk driving
is entitled to a jury instruction on the necessity defense as long as there is some evidence
that: (1) the defendant sought to prevent significant evil; (2) the defendant reasonably
believed there was no adequate alternative; (3) given the facts perceived by the
defendant, the harm avoided was not disproportionate to the harm caused; and (4) the
defendant stopped driving as soon as she reasonably believed the necessity ended.391
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Kalmakoff v. State
In Kalmakoff v. State,392 the supreme court held that the trial court must determine
certain issues of fact before considering whether an individual was in custody for
purposes of determining the legality of subsequent statements.393 Kalmakoff gave
statements to Alaska State Troopers during a series of four interviews.394 The trial court
admitted ostensibly confessional statements made during two of these interviews and
portions of a third interview.395 Kalmakoff appealed the decision and argued that the
interviews were inadmissible because they were tainted by portions of the interviews
which were found inadmissible.396 To determine whether subsequent interviews have
“purge[d] the taint” of prior inadmissible interviews, courts must consider several factors
related to the defendant’s condition in between the interviews.397 The supreme court held
that earlier, inadmissible inculpatory statements may have played a role in Kalmakoff’s
participation in the interviews, which were found to be admissible.398 Therefore, the court
remanded, holding that the trial court must determine certain issues of fact before
considering whether an individual was in custody for purposes of determining the legality
of subsequent statements.399
Marshall v. State
In Marshall v. State,400 the supreme court held that the right against selfincrimination requires a trial court to hold a hearing on the affirmative defense of
entrapment even when the defendant fails to submit evidence supporting each element of
the defense.401 Marshall was convicted of selling OxyContin pills to an undercover police
officer.402 The superior court denied his motion for a hearing on an entrapment defense
because he failed to allege specific evidence that supported his claim that the pills did not
belong to him.403 The supreme court held that the trial court was required to hold a
hearing on the affirmative defense of entrapment in this situation because requiring the
defendant to submit an affidavit alleging specific evidence is contrary to Alaska’s right
against self-incrimination.404 In such a hearing, the defendant may establish his or her
defense by relying on methods outside of his or her own testimony.405 The supreme court
remanded the case to the superior court, holding that the right against self-incrimination
requires a trial court to hold a hearing on the affirmative defense of entrapment even
when the defendant fails to submit evidence supporting each element of the defense.406
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Alaska Court of Appeals
Andrew v. State
In Andrew v. State,407 the court of appeals held that: (1) pursuant to section
11.16.100 of the Alaska Statutes, there is no distinction between proving a defendant’s
culpability with evidence related to her own personal conduct and proving a defendant’s
culpability with evidence related to her vicarious responsibility for the conduct of an
accomplice; and (2) juries are not required to specify any such distinction in their
verdict.408 Andrew and her boyfriend, Haws, burglarized a home, stole several items, and
concealed the items among several other stolen items from earlier burglaries.409 Andrew
appeared to have played a lesser role in the burglary than Haws.410 Andrew was
convicted of burglary of a residence and theft.411 Andrew argued on appeal that (1) the
evidence may have supported a conviction based on her vicarious liability but did not
support a conviction based on her personal conduct; and (2) the jury’s failure to specify
the theory under which she was convicted renders the verdicts invalid.412 The court of
appeals disagreed, noting that it is immaterial whether the defendant is convicted for her
own acts or those of an accomplice for whom she is legally responsible.413 Additionally,
so long as only one criminal act is alleged, the jury does not have to unanimously
articulate one theory for conviction if multiple theories are sufficient to prove the
defendant’s guilt.414 Affirming the superior court, the court of appeals held that: (1)
pursuant to section 11.16.100 of the Alaska Statutes, there is no distinction between
proving a defendant’s culpability with evidence related to her own personal conduct and
proving a defendant’s culpability with evidence related to her vicarious responsibility for
the conduct of an accomplice; and (2) juries are not required to specify any such
distinction in their verdict.415
B.F.L. v. State
In B.F.L. v. State,416 the court of appeals held that when the superior court
determines that a minor in a juvenile delinquency proceeding needs ongoing government
supervision, the superior court must impose the least restrictive alternative that will
satisfy the minor’s rehabilitative needs and protect the public.417 B.F.L. had a three year
history of juvenile delinquency that included failures on probation and in non-detention
placements.418 Following a hearing in 2009, the superior court imposed the most
restrictive of the three dispositions in Alaska Statute 47.12.120(b).419 On appeal, B.F.L
407
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argued that the superior court failed to adequately consider the two less-restrictive
dispositions, both of which would have kept B.F.L. out of a detention facility.420 The
court of appeals first held that its prior holdings—which required courts to refrain from
removing children from their homes “in all but extreme cases”—had been superseded by
Delinquency Rule 11(e) and Alaska Statute 47.12.140(2),421 which require courts to
impose the least restrictive alternative given the needs of the minor and the need to
protect the public.422 The court then held that the record supported the conclusion that a
detention disposition was the least restrictive alternative for B.F.L.423 Affirming the lower
court, the court of appeals held that in a juvenile delinquency proceeding, the superior
court must choose the least restrictive disposition that will satisfy the two goals of
rehabilitating the minor and protecting the public.424
Chase v. State
In Chase v. State,425 the court of appeals: (1) held that Alaska’s mandatory
seatbelt law was supported by a sufficient public interest; and (2) rejected the defendant’s
claim that it was an unconstitutional means of providing pretext for police stops.426 Chase
was pulled over in Fairbanks for driving while not wearing a seatbelt.427 During the
traffic stop, the officer discovered that Chase’s drivers’ license had been revoked.428 He
was arrested and convicted on several misdemeanors.429 Chase claimed that the seatbelt
law facially violates Article I, Section I of the Alaska Constitution, which guarantees
liberty and autonomy and argued that there was no public benefit from the law.430 The
court of appeals cited legislative history that the Alaska law would reduce deaths and
injuries from car accidents.431 Finally, the court of appeals held the seatbelt law was not
merely a pretext for officers to stop citizens looking for other crimes.432 The court of
appeals: (1) held that Alaska’s mandatory seatbelt law was supported by a sufficient
public interest; and (2) rejected the defendant’s claim that it was an unconstitutional
means of providing pretext for police stops.433
Clark v. State
In Clark v. State,434 the court of appeals held that police properly seized and
opened property left in a stolen vehicle based on the vehicle owner’s consent to the
search and the property owner’s reduced privacy interest in the item left in the car.435
420
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Officers detained Clark after she got into the passenger seat of a vehicle that had been
reported stolen.436 With the permission of the vehicle’s owner, Roatch, the officers
searched the car and found a cigarette case containing packets of cocaine, which Clark
later admitted belonged to her.437 Clark argued that the evidence regarding the cocaine
and her statements about it should be suppressed because the officers did not have a
warrant to search the car.438 However, the court determined that the search was
appropriate because Roatch consented to it, and officers are empowered to conduct
warrantless searches, including opening contents related to the search, if they have the
general consent of the person who has control of the place to be searched.439 The court
also noted that Roatch could agree to the search of the property Clark left in the car
because someone who leaves property in a stolen vehicle has no expectation of privacy
with respect to that property.440 In response to Clark’s argument that she did not know the
car was stolen, the court explained that the salient issue was actually whether the officers
on the scene could have reasonably believed that the car was stolen and were therefore
justified in concluding that Clark had a reduced privacy interest in any property she left
in the vehicle.441 Since the officers reasonably concluded that the car was stolen, the court
of appeals held that it was proper to determine that the owner of any property left in the
car had a reduced expectation of privacy and that the property was subject to search with
the consent of the vehicle’s owner.442
Davis v. State
In Davis v. State,443 the court of appeals held that the State was entitled to enforce
laws that were adopted from federal regulations, and that a tractor-trailer was considered
a commercial motor vehicle, even if it was not used exclusively for commercial
purposes.444 During a routine commercial vehicle inspection, Davis’s tractor-trailer was
ordered “out of service” for noncompliance with state rules for commercial vehicles.445
Davis was stopped four hours later and cited for operating a commercial vehicle that had
been placed “out of service.”446 A year later, he was cited for driving a commercial
vehicle without the required medical examiner’s certificate.447 Though Davis asserted
that the State lacked the authority to enforce federal law regulating commercial vehicles,
the court disagreed because the federal regulations had been adopted as state law;
therefore, it was state law that Davis violated.448 Davis also disputed that he was driving a
commercial motor vehicle because he was using his truck for non-commercial
purposes.449 The court rejected this argument because the only tractor-trailers that are
436
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excluded from the scope of these commercial vehicle regulations laws are those that are
used exclusively for non-commercial purposes.450 Davis could not show that his tractortrailer was used exclusively for non-commercial purposes and thus fell under the
exception.451 Affirming the lower courts, the court of appeals held that the State was
entitled to enforce state laws adopted from federal regulations, and that a tractor-trailer
was considered a commercial motor vehicle, even if it was sometimes used for noncommercial purposes.452
Fallon v. State
In Fallon v. State,453 the court of appeals held that a trooper’s stop was a valid
caretaker stop and the trooper was authorized to request the defendant’s driver’s license,
and the defendant resisted arrest by force because his conduct went beyond nonsubmission.454 Fallon was arrested after a trooper saw his vehicle in a ditch.455 The
trooper concluded Fallon had been drinking and arrested him for driving under the
influence.456 During the arrest, Fallon pushed his body away from the car and became
belligerent, so the trooper had to use pepper spray.457 Fallon was convicted of driving
under the influence and resisting arrest.458 Fallon appealed, arguing that he was illegally
seized when the trooper retained his driver’s license for several minutes and that the court
should have suppressed the evidence as a result.459 The court of appeals found the
trooper’s stop to be a valid community caretaker stop, allowing seizure without suspicion
of criminal activity because Fallon’s vehicle was in a ditch, where the driver might have
needed help.460 Defining “force,” the court concluded Fallon’s behavior and continual
struggle differed from mere non-submission.461 The court of appeals affirmed the
superior court’s ruling, holding that a trooper’s stop was a valid caretaker stop and the
trooper was authorized to request the defendant’s driver’s license, and the defendant
resisted arrest by force because his conduct went beyond non-submission.462
Felber v. State
In Felber v. State,463 the court of appeals held that a defendant who pleads guilty
to multiple crimes and receives a composite sentence cannot successfully appeal the
length of his sentence if the sentence is within the aggregated guideline ranges of
crimes.464 Felber was a third-felony offender465 who pled guilty, inter alia, to second450
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degree murder, vehicle theft, and four counts of first-degree assault in exchange for a
sentence of between fifty and eighty-five years.466 At the sentencing hearing, Felber
asked the superior court judge to rescind the plea agreement because he felt the proposed
sentence was too long for what he had done.467 The judge refused and sentenced Felber to
sixty-six years in prison.468 On appeal, Felber argued that because a second-degree
murder conviction would only result in a thirty-year sentence, the judge should have
rescinded the plea agreement.469 When reviewing a composite sentence, however, the
court of appeals looks at the potential aggregated sentences for all of the crimes to which
the defendant pleaded guilty.470 The aggregated potential sentences for Felber’s multiple
crimes would have been 246 years.471 Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals held
that a defendant who pleads guilty to multiple crimes and receives a composite sentence
cannot successfully appeal the length of his sentence if the sentence is within the
aggregated guideline ranges of crimes.472
Forster v. State
In Forster v. State,473 the court of appeals held that one illegally obtained
statement does not taint future legal interrogations where Miranda rights were waived;
good-time credit or mandatory parole cannot be withheld without further findings.474
Forster shot and killed a uniformed police officer.475 Forster was interrogated five times
in a five-day span, with four instances occurring after his first court appearance.476 The
superior court suppressed the first and fifth interrogations due to Miranda and Sixth
Amendment violations, respectively, but convicted Forster of murder based on the other
interrogations and sentenced him to 99 years in prison.477 Forster appealed on grounds
that the three other interrogations should have been suppressed due to violations of his
rights.478 The State cross-appealed on grounds that the trial court erred in its
sentencing.479 The court of appeals found that, while Forster’s mental state did not permit
him to competently waive his Miranda rights for the first interrogation, the intervening
court appearance between the first and second interrogations sufficiently reduced his
stress levels enough for him to knowingly waive his rights thereafter.480 Addressing the
State’s cross appeal, the court ruled that murder of a uniformed police officer engaged in
official duties carries a 99-year mandatory sentence without the possibility of any parole
or credit under Alaska law.481 In Forster’s case, the jury was not asked to find whether the
466
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murdered officer was engaged in official duties, and the trial judge ruled that this did not
permit the mandatory sentence; he instead imposed the maximum sentence within the
normal first-degree murder range and left Forster eligible for good-time credit and both
discretionary and mandatory parole.482 Thus, the court of appeals held that one illegally
obtained statement does not taint future legal interrogations where Miranda rights were
waived; good-time credit or mandatory parole cannot be withheld without further
findings.483
Lestenkof v. State
In Lestenkof v. State,484 the court of appeals affirmed a trial court’s decision to
move a trial to another location because the judge made a reasonable, diligent attempt to
seat a jury where the alleged offense occurred.485 The trial judge encountered problems
trying to seat a jury for Lestenkof’s trial in Saint Paul and, after four days of jury
selection, only 11 prospective jurors had not been excused.486 After examining several
options, the trial judge determined that the only alternative was to change venue.487 The
judge eventually transferred the trial to Dillingham.488 The court of appeals found that the
trial judge made considerable efforts to empanel a jury before moving the trial and that
any additional steps the judge could have taken to empanel a jury in Saint Paul were
unreasonable.489 The court of appeals also found that the Dillingham jury was a fair cross
section of the Saint Paul community because the Dillingham community has a similar
composition to Saint Paul490 and there was no record of any cognizable group being
underrepresented in Dillingham.491 Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed a trial court’s
decision to move a trial to another location because it made a reasonable, diligent attempt
to seat a jury where the alleged offense occurred.492
Procter v. State
In Proctor v. State,493 the court of appeals held using evidence of behavior in
prison to establish patterns does not violate a person’s right to confrontation even though
he would have to admit he had been incarcerated in order to cross-examine witnesses
testifying about his time in prison.494 Proctor was arrested after a neighbor, who had
witnessed him yelling and hitting a woman, called the police. In a jury trial, Proctor was
convicted of second and third degree assault.495 On appeal, Proctor argued that the trial
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court improperly admitted evidence of his behavior in prison.496 The court noted that
while “character evidence is generally inadmissible” because Proctor had claimed he was
not the aggressor, the state could introduce such evidence to rebut his claim.497 The court
of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to allow the state to introduce evidence of
Proctor’s behavior while incarcerated because it was a community with which he
habitually associated.498 Proctor argued that his right to confrontation was violated by the
correctional officer’s testimony because he could not cross-examine him without
revealing that he had previously been incarcerated.499 The court held that Proctor’s right
had not been violated because his decision not to cross-examine the officer was a
strategic move.500 Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals held using evidence of
behavior in prison to establish patterns does not violate a person’s right to confrontation
even though he would have to admit he had been incarcerated in order to cross-examine
witnesses testifying about his time in prison.501
Rogers v. State
In Rogers v. State,502 the court of appeals held that a defendant in a felony
prosecution can be convicted of an offense other than the one charged in the indictment
as long as the grand jury’s findings include the essential elements of that offense.503
Rogers’s gun discharged in a bar, killing the victim.504 Rogers was indicted for firstdegree murder.505 At trial, the prosecution alleged that Rogers intentionally fired the gun
at the victim, while the defense argued that Rogers’s gun had accidentally fired.506 The
jury convicted Rogers of manslaughter.507 Rogers appealed, arguing that there was a
“fatal variance” between the trial jury’s manslaughter verdict and the grand jury’s
indictment for first-degree murder.508 The court of appeals held that a defendant can be
found guilty of a lesser offense that is “necessarily included” in the charged offense.509
Whether a lesser offense is included in the charged offense depends on the facts charged
in the indictment and the evidence presented at trial.510 Because Rogers’s manslaughter
conviction flowed from the evidence presented at trial,511 and because the grand jury
finding of intentional killing included the essential elements of reckless killing, the court
held that there was no fatal variance.512 Affirming the superior court’s denial of Rogers’s
motion to dismiss, the court of appeals held that a defendant in a felony prosecution can
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be convicted of an offense other than the one charged in the indictment as long as the
grand jury’s findings include the essential elements of that offense.513
Silvera v. State
In Silvera v. State,514 the court of appeals held that words or actions directed at
third parties could be evidence of serious provocation with respect to mitigating
factors.515 Silvera along with Surina (his fiancée), Moore, and others took a taxi cab after
spending the night drinking.516 An argument ensued and Moore allegedly called Surina a
“whore” and then kicked her.517 Silvera then jumped up and cut the side of Moore’s face
with a knife.518 At sentencing, the trial judge rejected the mitigating factor of serious
provocation because the provoking acts and words were not directed at Silvera.519 Silvera
appealed.520 The court of appeals held that provocation can be found when the actions
were directed either at the defendant or at someone the defendant was defending.521 The
court reasoned that to find otherwise would prohibit a finding of serious provocation in
circumstances in which the heat of passion defense has traditionally been allowed.522
Reversing the lower court, the court of appeals held that words or actions directed at third
parties could be evidence of serious provocation with respect to mitigating factors.523
Smith v. State
In Smith v. State,524 the court of appeals held that a sixteen-year-old defendant
involved in a shooting is not entitled to statutory mitigation of his sentence for duress or
compulsion based on a theory that he was provoked, but the defendant may be entitled to
non-statutory mitigation because of his extraordinary potential for rehabilitation and his
developmental immaturity.525 Smith, a sixteen year old, entered a plea of guilty as an
adult to first-degree assault for providing a cohort with a handgun, with which the cohort
then wounded another teenager.526 At sentencing, Smith requested mediation on three
grounds: (1) duress, coercion, threat, or compulsion; (2) extraordinary potential for
rehabilitation; and (3) developmental immaturity.527 Developmental immaturity is a
mitigating factor that Alaska courts have not yet recognized.528 Despite evidence that the
victim provoked Smith, the superior court rejected Smith’s request for mitigation based
on duress mental or emotional compulsion does not meet the standards for provocation as

513

Id. at 1240–41.
244 P.3d 1138 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010).
515
Id. at 1147–49.
516
Id. at 1141.
517
Id. at 1141–42.
518
Id.
519
Id. 1142, 1148.
520
Id.
521
Id. at 1147–48.
522
Id. at 1148.
523
Id. at 1147–49.
524
229 P.3d 221 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010).
525
Id. at 223.
526
Id. at 22324.
527
Id. at 223.
528
Id.
514

37

defined in Alaska statutes.529 The superior court also rejected Smith’s non-statutory
mitigating factors despite considerable testimony by Smith’s experts supporting his
position without making any findings of fact as to the merit of the mitigating factors in
Smith’s case.530 The court of appeals affirmed the superior court’s rejection of Smith’s
statutory duress mitigating factor argument but vacated the superior court’s rulings as to
the non-statutory mitigating factors and remanded the case for reconsideration to include
findings of fact.531 In addition, the court of appeals tepidly supported developmental
immaturity as a new mitigating factor, citing United States Supreme Court precedent.532
Affirming in part and vacating in part, the court of appeals held that a sixteen-year-old
defendant involved in a shooting is not entitled to statutory mitigation of his sentence for
duress or compulsion based on a theory that he was provoked, but the defendant may be
entitled to non-statutory mitigation because of his extraordinary potential for
rehabilitation and his developmental immaturity.533
Solomon v. State
In Solomon v. State,534 the court of appeals held that although Alaska recognizes a
defense of unwitting intoxication to a DUI charge, the defense is available only if the
defendant became intoxicated due to a reasonable, non-negligent mistake about the
intoxicating nature of the substance the defendant ingested.535 Solomon was arrested for
driving under the influence and argued at his trial that he had not been drinking but had
ingested a quart of NyQuil.536 Solomon stated that he had not read the label on the bottle
and did not realize that NyQuil contains ten percent alcohol.537 Solomon requested a jury
instruction on the defense of unwitting intoxication because he did not have actual
knowledge that he had consumed an intoxicating substance, but the superior court judge
denied the request.538 The court of appeals affirmed the denial of the jury instruction.539
Solomon contended that this defense should be allowed when a defendant does not
knowingly consume an intoxicant and that the State should be forced to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the intoxicant was knowingly consumed.540 The court of appeals
found cases from other jurisdictions persuasive that limited the defense to instances in
which a defendant non-negligently consumed a substance that he reasonably believed
was not intoxicating.541 Because no reasonable juror could have believed that Solomon’s
failure to read the label on the NyQuil bottle was non-negligent, the court of appeals
affirmed the lower court ruling.542 The court of appeals held that although Alaska
recognizes a defense of unwitting intoxication to a DUI charge, the defense is available
529
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only if the defendant became intoxicated due to a reasonable, non-negligent mistake
about the intoxicating nature of the substance the defendant ingested.543
Starkweather v. State
In Starkweather v. State,544 the court of appeals held that when criminal
defendants are convicted of both first degree assault and attempted murder, the crimes
must be merged for sentencing purposes.545 Starkweather was convicted of burglary,
theft, sexual assault, attempted murder, and first-degree assault after attacking his
neighbor.546 Starkweather argued during sentencing in the superior court that he should
not receive separate sentences and punishments for attempted murder and first degree
assault because they arose from the same act and, if not merged, would constitute double
jeopardy.547 The superior court denied his claim, reasoning that assault and attempted
murder were sufficiently discrete crimes to support separate convictions and
punishments.548 The court of appeals reversed, holding that legislative indicated
attempted murder and assault were not meant to be punished as separate crimes, and that
the nature of the conduct should instead be considered only as an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance in sentencing.549 The court of appeals held that criminal
defendants may be charged with both attempted murder and assault, but if the jury finds
both crimes to be proven, they must be merged into a single conviction for attempted
murder.550
State v. Shetters
In State v. Shetters,551 the court of appeals held that a defendant is entitled to good
time credit for time spent in a correctional center or halfway house as a condition of
mandatory parole and for time spent there pending final decision about parole
revocation.552 Shetters was released on mandatory parole, but he was taken back into
custody, based on concerns of parole violation, and released to a “correctional restitution
center” (CRC) while the parole board determined whether to revoke his parole.553 The
Board permitted him to stay on parole so long as he remained at the CRC for four
additional months.554 He was arrested for another parole violation, after which he
returned to jail; he was not given credit toward his release date for his time spent in the
CRC.555 The court determined that serving mandatory parole is tantamount to serving
time in prison and does not mitigate a sentence like parole.556 Reversing the lower court,
the court of appeals held that a defendant is entitled to good time credit for time spent in a
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correctional center or halfway house as a condition of mandatory parole and for time
spent there pending final decision about parole revocation.557
State v. Shetters (On Rehearing)
In State v. Shetters,558 the court of appeals held that mandatory parolees remanded
to a non-prison correctional center by the Parole Board are entitled to credit for time
served and good time credit if they are later ordered to serve their remaining sentence.559
The State of Alaska petitioned the court of appeals to reconsider a prior holding.560 The
state challenged the court’s prior holding by making two arguments: (1) parolees that
reside at non-prison correctional centers are entitled to good time credit but not time
served credit; and (2) the Parole Board may use its discretion in awarding credit for time
served to parolees residing at non-prison correctional centers.561 The court of appeals
rejected both of these arguments, reasoning that there are no situations where an inmate
may be entitled to good time credit but not for time served.562 The court of appeals also
held that credit for time served is not a discretionary reduction of the defendant’s time to
serve.563 Re-affirming its prior decision, the court of appeals held that mandatory parolees
remanded to a non-prison correctional center by the Parole Board are entitled to credit for
time served and good time credit if they are later ordered to serve their remaining
sentence.564
State v. Siftsoff
In State v. Siftsoff,565 the court of appeals held that the hot pursuit warrant
exception did not apply when a police officer followed a speeder home and entered his
home without showing a compelling need for immediate action.566 A police officer was in
pursuit of Siftsoff for a speeding violation and eventually ended up at his trailer home.567
The officer told him not to enter the trailer, but Siftsoff ignored him.568 The officer then
entered the trailer and observed that Siftsoff was intoxicated.569 The trial court judge
excluded the evidence of intoxication.570 The court of appeals reasoned that because the
officer had not shown “a compelling need for official action and no time to secure a
warrant” the judge correctly suppressed the evidence.571 The court of appeals affirmed
the district court and held that the hot pursuit warrant exception did not apply when a
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police officer followed a speeder home and entered his home without showing a
compelling need for immediate action.572
Twogood v. State
In Twogood v. State,573 the court of appeals held that: (1) the amendment of a
prior judgment did not constitute a new sentencing act that would entitle a defendant to
an appearance before the court;574 (2) it was not plain error to require a sex offender to
submit to random drug testing if he had a history of substance abuse;575 and (3) the
Department of Correction’s (DOC) elimination of programs a defendant was required to
complete while incarcerated should have been addressed in a civil action against DOC.576
Twogood was indicted on multiple felony counts.577 As part of his plea, Twogood was
permitted to serve his sentences consecutively, though the judge refused to specify the
order of the sentences.578 On appeal, the court of appeals clarified the order and directed
the superior court to amend its earlier judgment.579 Twogood appealed.580 He argued that
the modifications effectively served as a new sentence, entitling him to address the judge
in person.581 The court of appeals held that the amendments were merely ministerial
because the superior court judge had no discretion in making them.582 Twogood also
appealed a requirement that he submit to random drug screenings, arguing that the
necessary “direct relationship” between this condition and his crime was absent.583 The
court held that because “direct relationship” requirement is interpreted broadly the judge
did not commit plain error by including this condition based on Twogood’s history of
drug abuse.584 Twogood further claimed that, because the DOC had stopped counseling
incarcerated prisoners, he was denied his right to the rehabilitative treatment that he was
ordered to complete.585 The court of appeals referred him to the DOC.586 Affirming the
lower court, the court of appeals held that: (1) the amendment of a prior judgment did not
constitute a new sentencing act that would entitle a defendant to an appearance before the
court;587 (2) it was not plain error to require a sex offender to submit to random drug
testing if he had a history of substance abuse;588 and (3) the DOC’s elimination of
programs a defendant was required to complete while incarcerated should have been
addressed in a civil action against the DOC.589
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Wilson v. State
In Wilson v. State,590 the court of appeals held that a prima facie case of
ineffective assistance of counsel is established when an individual is advised that entering
a no-contest plea in a criminal trial will not prejudice a later civil case against that
individual.591 Wilson pled no-contest to a charge of assault in the second degree.592
Wilson’s attorney advised him that entering the no-contest plea could not be used in a
civil trial as proof of the plaintiff’s allegations.593 The court of appeals reasoned that,
while there is normally a presumption of competence in ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, this presumption does not apply to advice relating to whether or not to enter a
plea to a criminal charge.594 Thus, the court of appeals held that a prima facie case of
ineffective assistance of counsel is established when an individual is advised that entering
a no-contest plea in a criminal trial will not prejudice a later civil case against that
individual.595
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
top
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
United States v. Lightfoot
In United States v. Lightfoot,596 the Ninth Circuit held that, when a criminal
defendant pleading guilty waives his right to appeal his sentence, the waiver does not
encompass his right to appeal a subsequent decision by the district court not to reduce the
defendant’s sentence under section 3582(c)(2) of the United States Code, unless the
waiver expressly states as much.597 Lightfoot pled guilty to, inter alia, possession of
crack cocaine with intent to distribute; his plea included a broad waiver of his right to
appeal the resulting sentence, and he was sentenced within the then-applicable guidelines
range.598 Subsequently, the United States Sentencing Commission reduced the guidelines
range for possession of crack cocaine and gave the reduction retroactive effect.599
Lightfoot filed a motion for reduction of his sentence pursuant to section 3582(c)(2) of
the United States Code, which the government opposed, asserting that Lightfoot posed a
continuing danger to society.600 The court held that motions for reduction of sentence are
“discretionary decision[s] separate from the original sentencing,” and the parties to the
original plea agreement probably did not contemplate whether the waiver encompassed
the right to appeal a section 3582(c)(2) decision, or else the agreement would have
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“expressly included or expressly excluded” a statement to that effect.601 Moreover,
because section 3582(c)(2) motions are substantially different proceedings, they do not
constitute an attack on the original sentence to which the waiver applied.602 Thus, the
Ninth Circuit held that, when a criminal defendant pleading guilty waives his right to
appeal his sentence, the waiver does not encompass his right to appeal a subsequent
decision by the district court not to reduce the defendant’s sentence under section
3582(c)(2) of the United States Code, unless the waiver expressly states as much.603
Alaska Supreme Court
Bailey v. State, Department of Corrections
In Bailey v. State, Department of Corrections,604 the supreme court held that
parole should not be revoked for failure to participate in a substance abuse program when
the parole board did not inform the parolee that failure to participate in a program would
result in automatic revocation of parole.605 Bailey’s judgment mandated that he
successfully complete substance abuse treatment if offered during his incarceration.606
After Bailey unsuccessfully applied to various programs, a parole violation hearing was
held and Bailey was instructed to apply for substance abuse treatment.607 Bailey applied
to the program but was not admitted,608 and, after a year, his parole was revoked for
failure to complete offered substance abuse treatment.609 The superior court affirmed the
revocation.610 On appeal, Bailey alleged that he did not have sufficient notice that his
failure to be accepted into the program would result in revocation of his parole.611 The
court acknowledged that due process required reasonable notice of what conditions must
be met to prevent parole revocation and reasoned that, during the parole violation
hearing, the parole board had simply ordered Bailey to apply to programs and had not
made it clear that if Bailey’s application was rejected his parole would be automatically
revoked.612 The court found that Bailey’s original judgment did not provide constructive
notice, because it only required him to enter a program if it was offered.613 Reversing the
decision of the lower court, the supreme court held that parole should not be revoked for
failure to participate in a substance abuse program when the parole board did not inform
the parolee that failure to participate in a program would result in automatic revocation of
parole.614
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Bradshaw v. State, Department of Administration
In Bradshaw v. State, Department of Administration,615 the supreme court held
that Alaska’s ten-year statute of limitations does not bar the Alaska Division of Motor
Vehicles (“DMV”) from charging a $100 statutory fee to reinstate the driver’s license of
a person whose license suspension began over ten years prior to applying for
reinstatement.616 Bradshaw’s license was suspended in 1995.617 In 2007, Bradshaw
applied to have his license reinstated, and the DMV charged him a $100 statutory
reinstatement fee.618 Bradshaw sued, arguing that the ten-year statute of limitations
barred the DMV from charging the fee.619 The supreme court affirmed the grant of
summary judgment to the State,620 holding that a government agency’s charging of a fee
is not an “action for a cause” subject to the statute of limitations.621 The court also held
that the DMV properly charged Bradshaw the fee under Alaska Statute
28.15.271(b)(3)(A), which requires the fee if the license has been suspended “within the
10 years preceding the application.”622 The court held that the statute applies to the status
of suspension and not the initial act of suspension.623 Affirming the lower court, the
supreme court held that Alaska’s ten-year statute of limitations does not bar the Alaska
DMV from charging a $100 statutory fee to reinstate the driver’s license of a person
whose license suspension began over ten years prior to applying for reinstatement.624
Farmer v. State
In Farmer v. State,625 the supreme court held that judicial expungement of
criminal records should only be an exceptional or extraordinary remedy.626 The FBI
prevented Farmer, a convicted felon, from purchasing a gun.627 Farmer proceeded to file
a pro se petition in superior court to expunge his record, arguing that ever since finishing
probation “he has led an honest and upright life,” that he needed the gun for hunting and
self defense, and that refusal to expunge would violate his Second Amendment
“constitutional right to bear arms.”628 The superior court denied Farmer’s petition and
held that there is no constitutionally protected right to purchase arms.629 Farmer appealed
the denial and argued on appeal that the superior court prevented his motion for
reconsideration of the court’s judgment.630 In declining to decide if Alaska courts possess
the authority to expunge, the court found that even if it did, Farmer’s circumstances were
not extraordinary; first, because Farmer failed to prove that his conviction and record
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were unlawful or invalid, and second, because restricting felons’ ability to purchase
firearms does not violate the limited Second Amendment right to bear arms.631 Finally,
the court found that the superior court did not abuse its discretion when the superior court
dismissed Farmer’s action with prejudice because absent Farmer’s filing a defective
motion, there was no reason for the superior court to know Farmer needed guidance.632
Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that judicial expungement of criminal
records should only be an exceptional or extraordinary remedy.633
Majaev v. State
In Majaev v. State,634 the supreme court held that a peace officer’s simple hand
signal directing an individual driver to stop, or come back to the officer, is a seizure when
it would compel a reasonable individual not to leave.635 Majaev began to drive away from
a turnout after an Alaska State Trooper pulled up next to Majaev’s truck.636 The trooper
stepped out behind Majaev's truck then waved Majaev back and gave him a sobriety
test.637 Majaev was charged with driving under the influence and moved to dismiss the
charge, arguing that he was subjected to an unlawful seizure.638 The district court denied
Majaev’s motion, and the court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that a hand signal is not
sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe that he is not free to leave; thus, there
was no seizure.639 The supreme court found that there is a seizure when an officer’s use
of authority would cause an objectively reasonable individual to feel compelled to stay.640
The Court reasoned that because section 28.35.182 of the Alaska Statute subjects persons
to criminal penalties for failure to stop vehicles at the signal (including hand signals) or
request of a peace officer, an objectively reasonable individual in Majaev’s position
would have felt compelled to stay and follow the trooper’s instructions in order to avoid
criminal penalty.641 Reversing the lower courts, the supreme court held that a peace
officer’s simple hand signal directing an individual driver to stop, or come back to the
officer, is a seizure when it would compel a reasonable individual not to leave.642
Alaska Court of Appeals
Alexie v. State
In Alexie v. State,643 the court of appeals held that first-time felony offenders
convicted of first-degree assault under section 11.41.200(a)(1) of the Alaska Statutes are
subject to the sentencing range of 7 to 11 years specified in section 12.55.125(c)(2) of the
631
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Alaska Statutes.644 Alexie pled no contest to first-degree assault under section
11.41.200(a)(1) of the Alaska Statutes, which involved recklessly causing serious
physical injury to another using a dangerous instrument.645 The superior court sentenced
Alexie under section 12.55.125(c) of the Alaska Statutes; subsection (2) of the statute
stated that if the defendant caused serious physical injury or death during the offense then
the presumptive sentencing range is 7 to 11 years.646 The supreme court had interpreted a
previous version of the sentencing statute not to provide a shorter sentence for reckless
manslaughter than reckless assault.647 Alexie challenged the current statute using similar
reasoning as the challenge to the earlier statute—that it was illogical for the legislature to
provide the same punishment for reckless manslaughter and reckless assault.648 The court
of appeals affirmed the superior court’s sentence, reasoning that it was the province of
the legislature, not the judiciary, to set the sentencing guidelines.649 The court of appeals
held that first-time felony offenders convicted of first-degree assault under section
11.41.200(a)(1) of the Alaska Statutes are subject to the sentencing range of 7 to 11 years
specified in section 12.55.125(c)(2) of the Alaska Statutes.650
Borchgrevink v. State
In Borchgrevink v. State,651 the court of appeals held that “first complaint”
evidence is admissible and may include a victim’s identification of the perpetrator only if
the victim testifies at the defendant’s trial.652 Borchgrevink was convicted of first-degree
assault and for a merged count of first-degree sexual assault and first-degree sexual abuse
of a minor.653 During a medical examination for injuries to her head and genitals, E.P.,
the minor-victim, identified Borchgrevink as her assailant.654 Before the trial the superior
court judge ruled that E.P.’s identification of Borchgrevink during the “first complaint”
would be allowed at trial; but when E.P. took the stand, Borchgrevink’s attorney had E.P.
declared incompetent as a witness.655 Borchgrevink appealed his convictions claiming
the “first complaint” evidence was improperly admitted in light of E.P.’s failure to
testify.656 The court of appeals held that the superior court erred in admitting the “first
complaint” identification information as evidence.657 While admitting E.P.’s “first
complaint” testimony at trial was an error, because Borchgrevink did not object during
trial to the admittance of the identification information, the court of appeals further held it
was reasonable to assume Borchgrevink made a tactical decision not to object and
therefore it was not a reversible error.658 Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals
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held that while a trial judge has the discretion to redact identification information from
“first complaint” testimony, such identification testimony is admissible only if the victim
testifies at trial.659
Cleveland v. State
In Cleveland v. State,660 the court of appeals held: (1) an appellate decision
becomes final when the time for filing a petition for hearing expires or the day after the
Alaska Supreme Court denies a petition for hearing; and (2) the statute of limitations for
filing for post conviction relief is not tolled while a motion to correct an illegal sentence
is pending.661 Cleveland’s petition for a hearing on an assault conviction was denied by
the supreme court in 2004.662 In 2007, Cleveland filed for post-conviction relief. The
superior court granted the State’s motion to dismiss because the petition was untimely.663
Cleveland appealed, arguing that because he had filed a motion to correct an illegal
sentence in the superior court before the supreme court had denied his petition for
hearing, the statute of limitations was tolled.664 The court of appeals first stated that
section 12.72.020(a)(3) of the Alaska Statutes requires criminal defendants who were
unnsuccessful on appeal to file for post-conviction relief within one year of the court of
appeals’ final decision.665 The court then determined that an appellate decision becomes
final either when the time for filing a petition for hearing expires or the day after Alaska
Supreme Court denies a petition for hearing.666 Since the decision affirming Cleveland’s
conviction became final when the Supreme Court denied his petition for hearing in 2004,
his 2007 application for post conviction relief was untimely.667 The statute of limitations
was not tolled while Cleveland’s motion to correct an illegal sentence was pending.668
Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals held: (1) an appellate decision becomes
final when the time for filing a petition for hearing expires or the day after the Alaska
Supreme Court denies a petition for hearing; and (2) the statute of limitations for filing
for post conviction relief is not tolled while a motion to correct an illegal sentence is
pending.669
Deemer v. State
In Deemer v. State,670 the court of appeals held that when the police have probable
cause to believe that physical evidence of a driver's identity is evidence of a crime, they
may search the passenger compartment and places where one would reasonably expect to
find that evidence.671 A state trooper stopped Deemer for a traffic violation.672 Deemer
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lied to the trooper about her identity, but another trooper recognized Deemer and ran her
name through the computer.673 The search revealed an outstanding warrant, so the
troopers arrested Deemer then searched her car and found a handgun and cocaine.674
Deemer challenged the search and the court of appeals initially found the search
lawful.675 The United States Supreme Court later issued a decision altering federal search
and seizure law and the Alaska Supreme Court ordered the court of appeals to reconsider
Deemer’s case.676 Police have the authority to search a vehicle incident to an arrest if they
have a reasonable belief that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in
the vehicle.677 Because Deemer had just committed the offense of falsely identifying
herself, the officers had the authority to search the vehicle for evidence of her
identification.678 Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals held that when the police
have probable cause to believe that physical evidence of a driver's identity is evidence of
a crime, they may search the passenger compartment and places where one would
reasonably expect to find that evidence.679
Evans v. State
In Evans v. State,680 the court of appeals held that a defendant is entitled to a
mistrial when the State discloses information mid-trial that should have been disclosed
earlier and fails to prove that the late disclosure was not prejudicial to the defendant.681
Evans was convicted of burglary, theft, and criminal mischief.682 On appeal, Evans
argued that the trial judge should have declared a mistrial because the State waited until
the middle of his trial to disclose exculpatory statements made by Evan’s co-defendant
during a police interview.683 The court of appeals noted that the State was required to
disclose the contents of the interview pursuant to Criminal Rules 16(b)(1)(A)(iii) and
16(b)(3).684 Because the interview was not disclosed, Evans’s attorney had no reason to
believe the interview contained exculpatory statements.685 After the interview statements
were disclosed mid-trial, Evans’s co-defendant claimed privilege and would not testify as
a witness.686 Consequently, the State failed to prove that its late disclosure was not
prejudicial, and Evans was entitled to a mistrial.687 The court of appeals held that a
defendant is entitled to a mistrial when the State discloses information mid-trial that
should have been disclosed earlier and fails to prove that the late disclosure was not
prejudicial to the defendant.688
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Ferguson v. State
In Ferguson v. State,689 the court of appeals held that the failure of an attorney to
adequately convey the implications of a plea agreement that a defendant accepts
constitutes incomplete legal advice, and the defendant is entitled to withdraw the plea.690
After consulting with his attorney, Ferguson accepted the State’s plea agreement under
the assumption that four years of his seven-year term of imprisonment would be
suspended.691 He also believed he would be eligible for good time credit against the
three-year portion of the sentence that he would actually serve, so he would only have to
serve two years.692 After realizing that he would not receive the good time credit,
Ferguson filed petition for post-conviction relief based on incompetent legal advice
concerning the plea agreement.693 On appeal, the court held that a defendant is entitled to
withdraw a plea if: (1) the defendant was given incomplete advice concerning the nature
of the sentence he would receive upon accepting a plea bargain; and (2) the defendant
would not have entered into the plea bargain if he had received accurate advice.694
Reversing the lower court, the court of appeals held that the failure of an attorney to
adequately convey the implications of a plea agreement that a defendant accepts
constitutes incomplete legal advice, and the defendant is entitled to withdraw the plea.695
Guthrie v. State
In Guthrie v. State,696 the court of appeals held that a jury cannot convict an
individual for failure to appear unless the appearance is required and a defendant
challenging a court’s denial to sever charges must show that joinder of the charges
created a prejudice against him.697 Guthrie failed to attend a scheduled court proceeding
regarding his upcoming assault trial.698 The State charged Guthrie with misdemeanor
failure to appear and consolidated both charges.699 The court denied Guthrie’s request to
sever the charges and the jury convicted Guthrie of both crimes.700 The court of appeals
reversed, finding that under section 12.30.060 of the Alaska Statutes, a jury cannot
convict an individual for failure to appear unless the state presents evidence that
appearance is required.701 Here, the State presented no evidence proving that the trial
judge imposed an obligation for Guthrie to appear.702 Additionally, the court of appeals
declined to determine Guthrie’s severance request because Guthrie failed to present
evidence showing that the joinder created any jury prejudice.703 Reversing in part and
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affirming in part, the court of appeals held that a jury cannot convict an individual for
failure to appear unless the appearance is required, and a defendant challenging a court’s
denial to sever charges must show that joinder of the charges created a prejudice against
him.704
Lamkin v. State
In Lamkin v. State,705 the court of appeals held that sentencing judges may not
suspend the imposition of sentence for a defendant convicted of felony assault.706 Lamkin
pled guilty to one count of assault in the third degree.707 At his sentencing hearing, he
argued that the court should suspend his sentence pursuant to section 12.55.125 of the
Alaska Statutes, under which he was convicted.708 The superior court judge refused,
citing section 12.55.085, which restricts a judge’s authority to suspend a sentence if the
offender is convicted of certain crimes, including assault in the third degree.709 The court
of appeals affirmed, resolving the apparently contradicting authority by using a rule of
statutory construction that favors specific statutes to more general ones.710 Here, although
the statute criminalizing Lamkin’s assault allows a judge to suspend the sentence of
certain offenders, a more focused statute that deals primarily with suspension of sentence
forbids the judge from doing so.711 Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals held
that sentencing judges may not suspend the imposition of sentence for a defendant
convicted of felony assault.712
Lindoff v. State
In Lindoff v. State,713 the court of appeals held that a defendant requesting to
withdraw a previously-accepted plea of guilty or no contest by arguing that he was not
advised on the consequences of the plea must, at a minimum, unequivocally assert that he
would not have entered the plea had he had been told the consequences.714 Lindoff, who
had already been convicted of a sex offense, was indicted for a second sex offense and
agreed to plead guilty.715 Under Criminal Rule 11(c)(4), a judge must advise two-time
sex offenders that they must register as sex offenders for life, but the judge did not do so
in this case.716 Lindoff moved to withdraw his guilty plea because he had not been
warned that he would be forced to register for life.717 After an evidentiary hearing, the
superior court judge denied Lindoff’s motion.718 The court of appeals noted that when
Lindoff was asked whether he would have pled guilty had he had known of the registry
704
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requirement, he stated, “I do not know that I would have.”719 The court held that Lindoff
bore the burden of producing evidence showing the judge’s violation of Rule 11(c)
prejudiced him, and this equivocal assertion made Lindoff’s request to withdraw the plea
insufficient as a matter of law.720 Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals held that
a defendant attempting to withdraw a previously-accepted plea of guilty or no contest by
arguing that he was not advised of the consequences of the plea must, at a minimum,
unequivocally assert that he would not have entered the plea had he had been told the
consequences.721
Linehan v. State
In Linehan v. State,722 the court of appeals held that: (1) hearsay evidence of a
murder victim’s statement evincing his state of mind before the murder is admissible only
if it is relevant to proving something about the victim’s conduct that will be disputed at
trial;723 and (2) testimony regarding a criminal defendant’s expression of admiration for a
movie is not admissible unless there is a close nexus between the movie and the
defendant that shows the testimony is being presented for a reason other than
circumstantial evidence of bad character.724 Linehan was convicted of first-degree
murder.725 On appeal, Linehan argued that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of
a letter, written by the victim, asserting that Linehan had a split personality and that if the
victim was killed, Linehan would likely be responsible.726 Linehan also argued that the
trial court improperly admitted evidence of his admiration of a character in a movie.727
On appeal, the court reasoned that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the letter
because there was no dispute regarding any aspect of Leppink’s mental state or conduct
that was alluded to in the letter.728 The court then held that because the case was based
mostly on circumstantial evidence and the letter essentially contained an “accusation
from the grave,” it was likely that the letter affected the verdict.729 The court also held
that Alaska Rule of Evidence 404 barred testimony that Linehan admired the main
character in the movie.730 The nexus between Linehan and the movie was not close
enough for the evidence to have been anything more than impermissible circumstantial
character evidence.731 Reversing the lower court, the court of appeals held that: (1)
hearsay evidence of a murder victim’s statement evincing his state of mind before the
murder is admissible only if it is relevant to proving something about the victim’s
conduct that will be disputed at trial;732 and (2) testimony regarding a criminal
defendant’s expression of admiration for a movie is not admissible unless there is a close
719
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nexus between the movie and the defendant that shows the testimony is being presented
for a reason other than circumstantial evidence of bad character.733
Ulak v. State
In Ulak v. State,734 the court of appeals held that unproven assertions in a
presentence report must be removed.735 Ulak plead guilty to assault in the third degree for
injuring C.S., a three-year old child, and admitted to aggravating factors, specifically that
she manifested deliberate cruelty.736 After her sentencing, however, she denied that she
ever injured C.S. and moved to strike her grandchildren’s hearsay statements that she
deliberately injured C.S. from the presentence report.737 The superior court denied the
motion but supplemented the record with Ulak’s version.738 On appeal, the court of
appeals held that when a defendant denies hearsay assertions, the burden is on the State to
present live testimony to support the assertions.739 The court noted that the superior court
failed to explicitly make a determination of fact and that it was not sufficient to merely
note disputed assertions in the presentence report.740 Remanding the case, the court of
appeals held that unproven assertions in a presentence report must be removed.741
West v. State
In West v. State,742 the court of appeals held that when a jury does not address a
factor upon which a presumptive sentencing range hinges, and the factor is raised by the
defense prior to sentencing, a new jury trial on that factor does not violate the double
jeopardy clause.743 West was convicted of first-degree robbery following a jury trial.744
Under Alaska’s sentencing law, West’s presumptive sentencing range depended on
whether he personally possessed or used a firearm during the robbery.745 During the trial,
that specific issue of fact was not asked to, or answered by the jury.746 After his
conviction West challenged the jury instruction, arguing that he was entitled to have a
jury decide whether he was personally armed during the robbery.747 The trial court
granted the new trial, but West appealed, arguing that it would violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause.748 The court of appeals reasoned that even if the jury instructions had
omitted an essential element of the crime, West could not be acquitted under the double
jeopardy clause.749 Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals held that when a jury
733
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does not address a factor upon which a presumptive sentencing range hinges, and the
factor is raised by the defense prior to sentencing, a new jury trial on that factor does not
violate the double jeopardy clause.750
ELECTION LAW
top
United States District Court for the District of Alaska
Miller v. Treadwell
In Miller v. Treadwell,751 the United States District Court for the District of
Alaska held that: (1) counting ballots that misspell a candidate’s name does not violate
the Elections Clause; and (2) the failure to create uniform rules for counting ballots does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause when it is done uniformly by the same panel of
officials.752 Miller filed claims contesting the results of the election for Lisa Murkowski’s
U.S. Senate seat because she did not appear on the ballot but was declared the winner of
the race after receiving enough write-in votes to defeat both Miller and the Democratic
candidate.753 Miller claimed that counting the numerous write-in ballots for Murkowski
that misspelled her name violated the Elections Clause of the Constitution because
Alaska law requires voters write in the candidate name “as it appears on the write-in
declaration of candidacy.”754 The district court agreed with the Alaska Supreme Court in
rejecting this claim, stating that the intent of the voter was paramount.755 Next, citing
Bush v. Gore, Miller claimed the Division of Elections’ failure to create “specific
standards” and “uniform rules” for elections violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
U.S. Constitution.756 The district court also rejected this claim, distinguishing the case
from Bush because, though subjectivity was involved in accepting or rejecting the writein ballots, it was all done uniformly by the same panel of officials.757 Affirming the lower
court, the United States District Court for the District of Alaska held that: (1) counting
ballots that misspell a candidate’s name does not violate the Elections Clause; and (2) the
failure to create uniform rules for counting ballots does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause when it is done uniformly by the same panel of officials.758
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EMPLOYMENT LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
Apone v. Fred Meyer, Inc.
In Apone v. Fred Meyer, Inc.,759 the supreme court held: (1) the Alaska Workers’
Compensation Board may recognize a worker’s expert witnesses while giving little
weight to their testimony; and (2) while the Board’s duty to assist pro se litigants is
similar to that of a court, the Board is not required to give guidance on strategy
decisions.760 Apone, a Fred Meyer gas station attendant, sought workers’ compensation
benefits for a physical illness he attributed to workplace exposure to gasoline fumes.761
At a workers’ compensation hearing, the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board allowed
the testimony of Apone’s expert witnesses—a chiropractor with no certification in
toxicology and an anti-toxins advocate who did not examine Apone or the work
environment at Fred Meyer.762 However, the Board gave their testimony less weight than
the testimony of the physician who conducted the employer’s independent medical
evaluation (EIME).763 The Board determined that Apone had failed to prove his claim.764
Apone appealed to the superior court, arguing that the Board did not adequately assist
him in preparing his case and that the Board abused its discretion by not recognizing his
expert witnesses.765 The superior court affirmed the Board’s decision, and Apone
appealed to the supreme court.766 The supreme court held that it was reasonable for the
Board to give less weight to Apone’s witnesses because Apone’s chiropractor did not
have training specific to toxins and because the toxins expert was not a medical doctor
capable of linking Apone’s illness to exposure at work.767 Additionally, because the
EIME physician was specifically trained in toxicology, the court found it reasonable for
the Board to rely more heavily on his testimony.768 The court also held that because
medical testimony is not required in all workers’ compensation cases, whether to present
a medical expert is a strategy decision.769 Therefore, the Board was not required to advise
Apone, a pro se litigant, on the use of expert testimony.770 Affirming the superior court,
the supreme court held: (1) the Board may recognize a worker’s expert witnesses while
giving little weight to their testimony; and (2) pro se litigants are not entitled to guidance
on strategy decisions from the Board.771
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Burke v. Houston NANA, L.L.C.
In Burke v. Houston NANA, L.L.C.,772 the supreme court held: (1) when an
employee is already receiving temporary total disability (TTD) benefits, the burden is on
the employer to show that the employee is no longer disabled;773 and (2) denial of
reimbursement for travel costs to a workers’ compensation hearing is an abuse of agency
discretion when the employee was unable to know in advance whether his credibility
would be an issue and his attendance necessary.774 Burke, an employee of Houston
NANA, L.L.C., was injured while working as a pipe fitter on the Alaska pipeline.775 The
Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board denied certain portions of Burke’s claim for
medical and disability benefits, and Burke contested the denials.776 The superior court
affirmed the Board’s decision, and Burke appealed.777 The supreme court held that since
Burke was already receiving TTD benefits, there was a presumption of disability that
Houston NANA had the burden to disprove.778 Since Houston NANA did not provide
substantial evidence to rebut the presumption, the Board erred in denying Burke’s request
for TTD benefits.779 The court also held that the Board abused its discretion by denying
Burke’s travel costs to attend his workers’ compensation hearing because he did not
know prior to the hearing whether his credibility would be an issue.780 Reversing in part
the superior court, the supreme court held: (1) when an employee is already receiving
TTD benefits, the burden is on the employer to show that the employee is no longer
disabled;781 and (2) denial of reimbursement for travel costs to a workers’ compensation
hearing is an abuse of agency discretion when the employee was unable to know in
advance whether his credibility would be an issue and his attendance necessary.782
Okpik v. City of Barrow
In Okpik v. City of Barrow,783 the supreme court held that a former employee’s
wrongful termination claim can survive summary judgment when she presents admissible
evidence disputing the justification for her demotion that is sufficient to raise an issue of
material fact regarding whether the employer violated its implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.784 The city of Barrow overpaid Mayor Nathaniel Olemaun.785 Both
Mayor Olemaun and finance director Lucy Okpik knew about the overpayment.786
Olemaun demoted Okpik and the day after her demotion Okpik resigned.787 Okpik
brought suit alleging she was demoted in retaliation for her role in Olemaun’s
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overpayment.788 The superior court granted Barrow’s motion for summary judgment and
Okpik appealed the court’s summary judgment on her due process, whistleblower and
wrongful termination claims.789 The supreme court affirmed summary judgment on the
due process and whistleblower claims but reversed the wrongful termination claim,
finding that a breach of “the implied covenant of good faith,” along with actual
termination, will support a wrongful conviction claim.790 The supreme court found that
Okpik’s rebuttal of some of the reasons for her demotion, her presentation of positive
employment evaluations, and evidence that Olemaun was personnel director, was
sufficient to create an issue of material fact regarding whether Barrow breached the
implied covenant of good faith and demoted Okpik for reasons other than her
performance and Olemaun’s overpayment.791 Thus, the supreme court held that a former
employee’s wrongful termination claim can survive summary judgment when she
presents admissible evidence disputing the justification for her demotion that is sufficient
to raise an issue of material fact regarding whether the employer violated its implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.792
Peterson v. State, Department of Natural Resources
In Peterson v. State, Department of Natural Resources,793 the supreme court held
that (1) review of a summary judgment should be based only on information available to
the lower court;794 (2) an employer does not breach the implied covenant of good faith
when its employment decisions were made in good faith;795 (3) a discrimination claim
fails if the employee cannot demonstrate that his employer’s justifications for its decision
are merely pretext;796 and, (4) a hostile work environment claim requires evidence of
persistent and abusive conduct.797 An employee claimed his employer breached its
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by withdrawing his firefighting
qualifications.798 The employee claimed that the employer discriminated against him
when it gave a position he had applied to someone else,799 and created a hostile work
environment because other employees made demeaning comments about him.800 The
superior court granted summary judgment against the employee.801 The employee then
submitted additional information to be considered by the supreme court.802 The supreme
court refused to consider the additional information, concluding that it would only review
information available to the lower court.803 The court found no breach of the employment
788
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contract because the decision to withdraw the employee’s qualifications had been made
by a good faith reliance on the available evidence about his professional conduct.804 The
court determined that the discrimination claim failed because he could not show that the
non-discriminatory justifications the employer cited for its employment decision were
mere pretext.805 Finally, the supreme court rejected the employee’s hostile work
environment claims because the comments at issue were too ambiguous, isolated, and
inoffensive to produce a hostile environment.806 The supreme court affirmed, holding
that (1) review of a summary judgment should be based only on information available to
the lower court;807 (2) an employer does not breach the implied covenant of good faith
when its employment decisions were made in good faith;808 (3) a discrimination claim
fails if the employee cannot demonstrate that his employer’s justifications for its decision
are merely pretext;809 and, (4) a hostile work environment claim requires evidence of
persistent and abusive conduct.810
Shehata v. Salvation Army
In Shehata v. Salvation Army,811 the supreme court held that in workers’
compensation cases, employees can only be forced to repay benefits obtained via fraud
when the fraud directly led to the procurement of the benefits.812 Shehata injured his
shoulder while working for the Salvation Army and received disability benefits.813
Without notifying the Salvation Army, Shehata began working part-time for pay.814
When the Salvation Army confronted Shehata about the job, he denied that he was being
paid.815 The Salvation Army petitioned the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board for
reimbursement of benefits pursuant to section 23.30.250(b) of the Alaska Statutes, which
permits the Board to order repayment of fraudulently earned benefits.816 The Board ruled
that Shehata lied and was required to repay all of the disability benefits he received as
well as more than $14,500 in attorneys’ fees.817 Shehata immediately appealed to the
Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission, but the commission affirmed the
decision and further awarded the Salvation Army over $5200 in additional attorneys’ fees
because Shehata’s appeal was “frivolous.”818 The supreme court agreed with the
Commission that employers are entitled to reimbursement of benefits gained via fraud,
and also agreed that the employers need not fully prove all elements of common law
fraud to be repaid.819 However, the court held that Shehata’s misrepresentation did not
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directly cause him to receive benefits, as the false statement came more than a month
after he began receiving disability payments.820 Additionally, the court held that
Shehata’s appeal was not frivolous because it was brought in good faith and material
questions of law and fact remained.821 Therefore, the court overturned the attorneys’ fees
awarded for the appeal and the repayment of any benefits received prior to the fraud.822
Reversing in part, the supreme court held that in workers’ compensation cases,
employees can only be forced to repay benefits obtained via fraud when the fraud directly
led to the procurement of the benefits.823
Smith v. Anchorage School District
In Smith v. Anchorage School District,824 the supreme court held that terminated
employees must offer sufficient material evidence to prove claims of employment
discrimination and breach of the convent of good faith and fair dealing against the school
district where they were employed.825 The Anchorage School District terminated Smith
from his security position and he sued claiming race, age, and disability discrimination as
well as breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.826 The supreme court held
summary judgment was proper on all claims because Smith failed to present any
evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact.827 Affirming the lower court decision,
the supreme court held that terminated employees must offer sufficient material evidence
to prove claims of employment discrimination and breach of the convent of good faith
and fair dealing against the school district where they were employed.828
State v. Public Safety Employees Association
In State v. Public Safety Employees Association,829 the supreme court held that
arbitrators’ decisions are entitled to substantial deference when parties bargain for a
binding arbitration agreement, even if the court would have reached a different
outcome.830 After a Department of Transportation officer was terminated because of
inappropriate comments he made while intoxicated, the Public Safety Employees
Association (“PSEA”) filed a grievance with the State that went to arbitration.831 The
arbitrator determined that mitigating factors made termination excessive, and he ordered
the Department to reinstate the officer without back pay.832 The State appealed to the
superior court, which granted summary judgment to PSEA.833 The supreme court
affirmed, holding that the arbitrator’s decision was entitled to deference because the State
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failed to show the arbitrator had committed gross error.834 Affirming the lower court, the
supreme court held that arbitrators’ decisions are entitled to substantial deference when
parties bargain for a binding arbitration agreement, even if the court would have reached
a different outcome.835
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
top
Alaska Court of Appeals
Charles v. State
In Charles v. State,836 the court of appeals held that a defendant was not entitled
to raise a subsistence defense after violating regulations that require hunters to have
harvest tickets, and that for a state regulation to be inconsistent with federal law there
must be some deficiency in the administrative proceedings or the regulation must have
been arbitrary or unreasonable.837 The superior court convicted Charles for unlawful
possession and transportation of game and hunting without the required harvest tickets
for his involvement in a situation where deer were shot on federal land on Prince Wales
Island.838 Charles argued that the subsistence priority found in the Alaska National
Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 (ANILCA) entitled him to defend against the
charges by claiming the hunting was needed for subsistence.839 The court determined that
Charles was not entitled to raise a subsistence defense because, without a regulation
authorizing subsistence hunting, he had no right to violate the current regulations.840
Charles also argued that the current state regulations conflicted with the ANILCA and the
state regulations were therefore invalid.841 Charles' hunting of does, however, violated
both federal and state regulations, which weighs against a conflict.842 Further, Charles
provided no record of deficiencies in the administrative proceedings that developed the
regulations or that the regulations were arbitrary and unreasonable when enacted, which
would be required to challenge the regulations.843 Affirming the lower court, the court of
appeals held that a defendant was not entitled to raise a subsistence defense after
violating regulations that require hunters to have harvest tickets, and that for a state
regulation to be inconsistent with federal law there must be some deficiency in the
administrative proceedings or the regulation must have been arbitrary or unreasonable.844
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ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
top
Stewart v. Elliott
In Stewart v. Elliott,845 the supreme court held that when a driver’s attorney in a
criminal action is not a party to the post-conviction relief action and neither directed nor
controlled that litigation, the post-conviction relief decision does not have preclusive
effect in a malpractice action.846 A driver was arrested for a felony driving under the
influence (DUI) on the day a new DUI law took effect.847 The driver pleaded no contest
to the DUI charge in exchange for a reduction from a felony to a misdemeanor.848 The
superior court later granted the driver post-conviction relief, concluding his counsel was
ineffective in failing to recognize that the new DUI law became effective at the time of
the arrest.849 The driver brought a malpractice suit against the attorney, relying on the
decision in the post-conviction relief action to demonstrate the attorney did not recognize
the date discrepancy.850 The superior court declined to give the post-conviction decision
preclusive effect and ruled that the driver presented insufficient evidence to prove
negligence.851 The supreme court agreed, holding there was no privity for the defendant
attorney with the prior decision, and there was insufficient evidence to prove a breach of
attorney duty.852 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that when a driver’s
attorney in a criminal action is not a party to the post-conviction relief action and neither
directed nor controlled that litigation, the post-conviction relief decision does not have
preclusive effect in a malpractice action.853
FAMILY LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
Barbara P. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services
In Barbara P. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services,854 the supreme
court determined that a finding that a parent has not remedied the conduct or conditions
that places his or her child at risk is a question of fact that will only be reviewed for clear
error.855 The Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”) filed a petition to terminate
Barbara’s parental rights and the father’s parental rights to their two children.856 The
superior court terminated both parents’ parental rights because both children were in need
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of aid857 due to: (1) domestic violence by both parents, substance abuse by both parents,
Barbara’s mental health issues, and abandonment by the father, (2) the parents’ failure to
remedy the conduct and conditions that placed the children at risk of harm, and (3) OCS
made reasonable efforts to provide services to reunite the family.858 The supreme court
held that determinations of whether or not a parent has remedied conduct that places a
child at risk is best determined by a trial court and will be reviewed for clear error.859 The
supreme court then found that the superior court’s findings were adequately supported by
the record.860 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court determined that a finding that
a parent has not remedied the conduct or conditions that places his or her child at risk is a
question of fact that will only be reviewed for clear error.861
Barnett v. Barnett
In Barnett v. Barnett,862 the supreme court held that courtship costs do not qualify
as marital debt under Alaska law for purposes of calculating spousal support, and that
immigration sponsorship pledges are not actionable for support under federal law.863 Mr.
Bennett paid for his courtship visits and the entire costs of Mrs. Bennett’s pre-marital
move from Belarus to Fairbanks.864 These expenses included the filing of immigration
paperwork for Mrs. Bennett and her daughter, in which Mr. Bennett pledged to be their
sponsor and to support them.865 After Mr. Bennett filed for divorce, Mrs. Bennett
requested spousal support and attorneys’ fees under both state and federal law,
contending that the immigration sponsor pledge required Mr. Bennett to support her for
ten years after her entry into the country.866 On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the
superior court’s award of no support under federal law, but remanded the state law
spousal support question.867 The supreme court found that the superior court had
improperly treated Mr. Bennett’s “courtship costs” as “marital debt” that reduced the
state law spousal support award and therefore remanded for reconsideration of Mrs.
Bennett’s monthly spousal support and for more factual findings regarding her earning
capacity and educational expenses.868 The supreme court held that courtship costs do not
qualify as marital debt under Alaska law for purposes of calculating spousal support, and
that immigration sponsorship pledges are not actionable for support under federal law.869
Brotherton v. Warner
In Brotherton v. Warner,870 the supreme court held that superior courts may order
child custody payments beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday, even if the parents have
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designated another person to care for the child.871 Brotherton was ordered to pay child
custody payments under section 25.24.170(a) of the Alaska Statutes after his child turned
eighteen.872 On appeal, he argued that the statute did not apply to him because his child’s
caretakers were not parents, guardians, or designees.873 He argued that the caretakers may
have been designees before the child turned eighteen, they could no longer be considered
designees because after turning eighteen his child could not be subject to the legal
custody of another person.874 The supreme court noted that the statute was enacted to
protect children who were still in high school when they turned eighteen; the court noted
that Brotherton’s interpretation would render the statute meaningless.875 The supreme
court held that superior courts may order child custody payments beyond the child’s
eighteenth birthday, even if the parents have designated another person to care for the
child.876
Cartee v. Cartee
In Cartee v. Cartee,877 the supreme court held that a 60/40 property division was
not an abuse of discretion and that property awards made to facilitate career training
should be analyzed under the property division statute and not under the rehabilitative
alimony standard.878 In a divorce action, the husband appealed the trial court’s award of
sixty percent of the marital property to his former wife, arguing in part that the court had
improperly awarded rehabilitative alimony.879 While there is a presumption that an equal
division of marital property is equitable, section 25.24.106(a)(4) of the Alaska Statutes
allows for an unequal property division if a court, after taking into consideration the
“Merrill factors,” determines that an unequal property division would fairly allocate the
economic effects of divorce.880 The standard for determining rehabilitative alimony is
narrower than for property division and serve the specific purpose of funding a spouse’s
education or job training.881 Here, because the wife sacrificed career advancement to care
for the couple’s child, the court gave her a greater percentage of the marital property.882
Because the allocation did not require the wife to return to school but rather provided the
opportunity, the more general property division was held to be the appropriate standard
rather than the more rigid rehabilitative alimony standard.883 The supreme court affirmed
the trial court decision, holding that a 60/40 property division was not an abuse of
discretion and that property awards made to facilitate career training should be analyzed
under the property division statute and not under the rehabilitative alimony standard.884
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Charles v. State
In Charles v. State,885 the supreme court held that it was appropriate to terminate
parental rights where the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made active efforts to
prevent the break-up of an Alaska Native family and where returning the children to the
parent’s custody would result in harm to the children.886 To terminate parental rights, the
court must find that active efforts were made to rehabilitate the parent and keep the
family intact.887 The trial court determined that OCS’s repeated referrals of Charles to
substance abuse and anger management programs, scheduling of visitation with his
children, provision of bus passes and phone cards, and creation of a personalized case
plan were sufficient to meet this standard.888 Termination of rights also requires a
showing, including testimony by an expert witness, that returning the children to the
parent’s care would likely result in “serious emotional or physical damage” to the
children.889 Charles disputed the testimony provided by the expert in his trial, claiming
that it was based only on generalizations.890 The trial court disagreed.891 Affirming the
lower court, the supreme court held that it was appropriate to terminate parental rights
where OCS made active efforts to prevent the break-up of an Alaska Native family and
where returning the children to the parent’s custody would result in harm to the
children.892
Colton v. Colton
In Colton v. Colton,893 the supreme court held that, when dividing property in a
divorce proceeding, the court should employ contract law principles that unexpressed
intentions and mental reservations do not override objective indications of assent to terms
of an agreement.894 This case arose out of a divorce proceeding in which the parties
reached an agreement on all property division issues.895 The trial court entered into the
record that the husband was to make a cash payment to his wife.896 The husband
appealed, arguing (1) the superior court erred in finding the husband agreed to make this
payment to his wife because he did not understand it would result in unequal property
division, and (2) the superior court abused its discretion in enforcing this agreement
because it was made without the husband’s full understanding.897 The supreme court
held that all objective evidence pointed against the husband’s assent being contingent on
an “equal” division and therefore the lower court did not err in enforcing the
agreement.898 Affirming the judgment of the trial court, the supreme court held that,
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when dividing property in a divorce proceeding, the court should employ contract law
principles that unexpressed intentions and mental reservations do not override objective
indications of assent to terms of an agreement.899
Doug Y. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services
In Doug Y. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services,900 the supreme court held
that an Office of Children’s Services (OCS) petition to terminate parental rights should
be granted when a parent fails to change behavior that put his child at risk despite
receiving adequate time and reasonable family services.901 First in 2005, and then in
2007, OCS was called to investigate Doug Y. for beating his son, Damien.902 OCS
created a case plan for Doug with the goal of allowing him to regain custody.903 In 2009,
due to Doug’s failure to fully comply with the plan and Damien’s continuing trauma, the
superior court granted a termination of Doug’s parental rights.904 Doug appealed, arguing
that Damien was not a child in need of aid due to Doug’s substance abuse, OCS did not
prove that Doug failed to change his harmful behavior, OCS failed to make a reasonable
effort to provide Doug with family support services, and terminating Doug’s parental
rights was not in Damien’s best interest.905 The supreme court first held that a finding that
a child is in need of aid for any of the reasons in section 47.10.011 of the Alaska Statutes
is sufficient to support termination. Since Doug conceded physically harming Damien,
his substance abuse was irrelevant.906 Next, the court applied the factors listed in section
47.10.088(b) and found that Doug did not remedy the behavior that put Damien at risk
for substantial harm.907 Finally, the court found that OCS provided adequate family
support services, despite not hiring a counselor for Doug, and that the superior court was
justified in finding termination of Doug’s rights to be in Damien’s best interest.908
Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that an OCS petition to terminate
parental rights should be granted when a parent fails to change behavior that put his child
at risk despite receiving adequate time and reasonable family services.909
Hill v. Bloom
In Hill v. Bloom,910 the supreme court held that five months of income data was
not sufficient to qualify as new evidence requiring the modification of child support and
that, even if the data did qualify, it was not sufficient to show a material and permanent
change in circumstances.911 The superior court calculated Hill’s child support payments
to Bloom based on a five-year average of Hill’s income from her business, excluding
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dramatically lower income from 2007, which the court found an “aberration.”912 Later,
Hill filed a motion to modify child support, arguing that business changes depressed her
earnings during the first six months of 2008 and her income would be dramatically less
than anticipated.913 The court found that concerns over prompt modification of payments
must be balanced with the need to let sufficient time pass to prove a change in income.914
Here, the superior court averaged income over five years and only five months had
passed since the decision.915 Because small businesses are prone to dramatic fluctuations,
the supreme court held that it was not error to deny Hill’s motion for child support
modification without an evidentiary hearing.916 The supreme court affirmed the superior
court’s denial of Hill’s motion to modify child support without an evidentiary hearing,
finding that five months of income data was not sufficient to qualify as new evidence
requiring the modification of child support and that, even if the data were considered new
evidence, it was not sufficient to show a material and permanent change in
circumstances.917
Husseini v. Husseini
In Husseini v. Husseini,918 the supreme court held: (1) a divorce decree dissolving
a marriage is a final judgment even when some issues have been reserved;919 and (2) in
the absence of exceptional circumstances, it is error for a trial court to sell marital assets
prior to issuing a divorce judgment.920 After separating from her husband, Janice
continued to occupy the marital residence.921 At a hearing held before the divorce was
finalized, the trial court gave Janice thirty days to refinance the home in her name and,
against her objections, bifurcated the divorce from the property proceedings.922 Janice
was unable to refinance, so the court ordered the sale of the house.923 Janice appealed,
arguing the trial court erred in bifurcating the divorce proceedings and in ordering the
sale of the home prior to a final judgment on property division.924 The supreme court held
that Janice’s appeal of the bifurcation was untimely and a divorce decree is a final
judgment even when some issues have been reserved.925 Because that rule had not been
announced prior to this decision, the supreme court considered the merits of Janice’s
claim.926 The supreme court determined that the trial court committed harmless error in
bifurcating the divorce proceedings but erred in ordering the pre-judgment sale of the
house because it did not make factual findings showing a pressing reason for the sale.927
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Vacating and remanding, the court held: (1) a divorce decree dissolving a marriage is a
final judgment even when some issues have been reserved;928 and (2) in the absence of
exceptional circumstances, it is error for a trial court to sell marital assets prior to issuing
a divorce judgment.929
Kent V. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services
In Kent V. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,930 the supreme court
held that the state’s second petition to terminate a father’s parental rights was not barred
by the doctrine of res judicata because the state raised new material facts.931 The
defendant appealed the superior court’s decision to allow the state to relitigate its parental
rights termination case after a prior holding that termination of parental rights was not
necessary.932 The court held that new psychological evidence, which suggested the child
would not be able to develop properly if he were kept with his parents, was a new
material fact, and that the state’s second petition therefore was not barred by res
judicata.933 Thus, the supreme court held that the state’s second petition to terminate a
father’s parental rights was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the state
raised new material facts.934
Millette v. Millette
In Millette v. Millette,935 the supreme court held that the cost of nutritional
supplements recommended by a physician and purchased from a clinic are reasonable
health care expenses for reimbursement pursuant to a child support order.936 Pursuant to
a child support order requiring payment for cost of natural health care, the divorced
mother of an autistic child sought reimbursement from her ex-husband for nutritional
supplements that were recommended to her by a health care practitioner.937 The superior
court ordered the ex-husband to pay for the nutritional supplements.938 On appeal, the
ex-husband argued that he should not have to pay these expenses because the
supplements are part of the child’s nutritional expenses, not health care expenses.939 The
supreme court reasoned, however, that the cost of these nutritional supplements could be
considered health care expenses because the nutritional supplements had been purchased
directly from a clinic, the invoices for the supplements also contained charges for
appointments, and the supreme court has consistently interpreted “health expenses” for
child support broadly.940 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that the cost
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of nutritional supplements recommended by a physician and purchased from a clinic are
reasonable health care expenses for reimbursement pursuant to a child support order.941
Misyura v. Misyura
In Misyura v. Misyura,942 the supreme court held: (1) is not an abuse of discretion
for a trial court to find a history of domestic violence based solely on the testimony of a
the battered spouse; and (2) a trial court errs by allowing a spouse to condition continued
visitation rights on participation in an intervention program.943 Lyudmila Misyura
obtained a domestic violence protective order against her husband, Sergey Misyura, after
testifying of two separate instances of abuse.944 During the divorce proceeding, she
testified about many other instances of domestic violence that occurred during the
marriage.945 The trial court found a history of domestic violence, awarded sole legal and
physical child custody to Lyudmila, and ordered that Lyudmila could require Sergey to
attend an intervention program as a prerequisite to exercising his unsupervised visitation
rights.946 The trial court had discretion to determine the credibility of the plaintiff’s
testimony, even without any corroborating evidence or witnesses.947 The court, not a
spouse, decides whether a party must attend an intervention program to maintain
visitation rights.948 Affirming in part and reversing in part, the supreme court held: (1) is
not an abuse of discretion for a trial court to find a history of domestic violence based
solely on the testimony of a the battered spouse; and (2) a trial court errs by allowing a
spouse to condition continued visitation rights on participation in an intervention
program.949
Osterkamp v. Stiles (I)
In Osterkamp v. Stiles,950 the supreme court held that in determining whether a
foster parent has established psychological parent status, a court may rely on the short
length of the parent-child relationship, the child's young age, and the fact that the foster
parent allowed somebody else to adopt the child.951 Osterkamp and Stiles were foster
parents for a child until Stiles adopted the child when he was sixteen months old.952 The
two domestic partners separated after the adoption.953 Stiles began limiting Osterkamp’s
custody and visitation and he filed a complaint, asking for custody and visitation.954 The
superior court awarded sole physical and legal custody to Stiles and Osterkamp
appealed.955 The supreme court determined that for Osterkamp to establish custody
941
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despite Stiles’s objections, he would have to first prove that he was the child’s
psychological parent at the time of the custody application by clear and convincing
evidence.956 Since the relevant time period for determining the relationship was so short,
the child was so young, and Osterkamp voluntarily allowed Stiles to adopt the child by
herself, the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision that psychological parent
status was not established.957 Affirming the superior court’s ruling, the supreme court
held that in determining whether a foster parent has established psychological parent
status, a court may rely on the short length of the parent-child relationship, the child's
young age, and the fact that the foster parent allowed somebody else to adopt the child.958
Osterkamp v. Stiles (II)
In Osterkamp v. Stiles,959 the supreme court held that an adoptive mother could
not be equitably estopped from withholding consent for her partner to adopt her child
when she never unconditionally agreed to allow the adoption.960 Stiles adopted a foster
child that she and Osterkamp had raised for sixteen months.961 At the adoption hearing
Osterkamp did not object to Stiles adopting the child individually and did not request
post-adoption rights.962 Osterkamp and Stiles originally agreed that Osterkamp’s adoption
of the child was dependent upon an improvement in their relationship.963 After the couple
separated, Osterkamp filed for joint custody; the superior court denied because
Osterkamp had proved neither psychological parent status nor that denying custody
would be detrimental to the child.964 Osterkamp then filed a petition for adoption.965 In
response to Stiles’ motion to dismiss, Osterkamp argued that Stiles could be equitably
estopped from withholding consent.966 The superior court judge allowed that equitable
estoppel might sometimes be applicable but found that the evidence did not support the
claim and Osterkamp appealed.967 The supreme court did not decide whether equitable
estoppel might apply in some petitions for adoption, but explained that reasonable
reliance and resulting prejudice are generally required for equitable estoppel.968 Thus, the
supreme court held that an adoptive mother could not be equitably estopped from
withholding consent for her partner to adopt her child when she never unconditionally
agreed to allow the adoption.969
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Partridge v. Partridge
In Partridge v. Partridge,970 the supreme court held that a lower court’s fair
evaluation of the economic effect of a divorce is a three-step process reviewable under
the abuse of discretion standard.971 During the divorce proceedings, the trial court
determined that an even division of assets at the legal date of separation was
appropriate.972 James Partridge challenged the court’s allocation of assets claiming the
court mischaracterized assets and failed to consider his contributions of separate property
to the marriage.973 The supreme court articulated a three-step property division test to be
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard as: (1) the characterization of property as
separate or marital; (2) the value placed upon the property; and (3) the allocation of
property as equitable.974 The supreme court found that not crediting James for marital
debt he paid and a failure to determine the existence of pension funds at the time of trial
were an abuse of discretion, and all other evaluations by the trial court were neither
clearly erroneous nor an abuse of discretion.975 The supreme court reversed and
remanded, holding that a lower court’s fair evaluation of the economic effect of a divorce
is a three-step process reviewable under the abuse of discretion standard.976
Sparks v. Sparks
In Sparks v. Sparks,977 the supreme court held that proceeds from a court
settlement are marital property when the evidence shows an intent to donate the disputed
portion of the settlement proceeds to the marital estate.978 Shelia Sparks retired early due
to a disability and sued her disability insurance carrier for discontinuing payments; she
settled the case in 2004.979 A portion of the settlement provided monthly payments for
Shelia and Richard Sparks that would continue in reduced payments if Shelia
predeceased Richard.980 The supreme court reasoned that the inclusion of Richard Sparks
as a payee in the settlement and the continuation of payments to him if Shelia died
demonstrated an intent to donate those settlement payments to the marriage.981 The
supreme court affirmed the superior court’s holding that damage payments replacing
long-term disability payments which served as retirement benefits should be divided
based on the length of the marriage982 and that the superior court did not clearly err in
finding an intent to donate damages when the settlement listed the husband as a payee.983
Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that proceeds from a court settlement
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are marital property when the evidence shows an intent to donate the disputed portion of
the settlement proceeds to the marital estate.984
Wee v. Eggener
In Wee v. Eggener,985 the supreme court held that: (1) a trial court errs when it awards
joint custody and fails to address a presumption against custody for a party with a history
of domestic violence; and (2) an independent basis must exist with respect to each party
when a mutual restraining order is ordered.986 The domestic relationship between Wee
and Eggener was plagued by abuse allegations by Wee, which resulted in a protective
order being issued against Eggener.987 Eggener and Wee both filed for sole legal and
primary physical custody of their child, and the trial court ordered joint physical custody
and granted a mutual no contact order.988 The supreme court denied custody to Eggener
because the trial court found that Eggener had a history of domestic violence, but did not
address a statutory rebuttable presumption against awarding custody to a parent who has
a history of domestic violence.989 Further, the court vacated the no-contact order as it
applied to Wee because no independent basis existed for a no-contact order against
Wee.990 Vacating the lower court, the supreme court held that: (1) a trial court errs when
it awards joint custody and fails to address a presumption against custody for a party with
a history of domestic violence; and (2) an independent basis must exist with respect to
each party when a mutual restraining order is ordered.991
Williams v. Barbee
In Williams v. Barbee,992 the supreme court held that, when allegations of
domestic violence arise in custody hearings, the superior court must make a finding as to
whether there has been a “history of domestic violence” under section 25.24.150(h) of the
Alaska Statutes.993 During a custody hearing, Williams presented evidence that Barbee
had been convicted of assaulting her while they were married.994 The trial court weighed
this evidence against other factors and granted both parents joint custody.995 On appeal,
Williams argued that Barbee should not have been granted custody because he had a
history of domestic violence and section 25.24.150(h) creates a rebuttable presumption
against the violent parent.996 The supreme court noted that a single instance of domestic
violence can be considered a “history of domestic violence” for purposes of the statute.997
It also noted that the superior court had not made a finding as to whether there was a
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history of domestic violence.998 The supreme court held that, when allegations of
domestic violence arise in custody hearings, the superior court must make a finding as to
whether there has been a “history of domestic violence” under section 25.24.150(h) of the
Alaska Statutes.999
Worland v. Worland
In Worland v. Worland,1000 the supreme court held: (1) courts may not equitably
divide total retirement pay; and (2) when issuing sanctions courts must identify either the
nature of the sanction or the rule upon which they relied to impose the sanction.1001
Jacqueline Worland filed for divorce against her former husband, Charles.1002 The
superior court entered an amended divorce decree assigning Jacqueline 50% of Charles’s
gross military retirement pay as a sanction for him removing Jacqueline from the survivor
benefits plan.1003 On appeal, Charles argued that the court erred in awarding Jacqueline
50% of his gross retirement pay and that he was sanctioned erroneously.1004 The supreme
court held that “a court may not equitably divide total retired pay; it may equitably divide
only the amount of retired pay remaining after the court deducts waived retired pay and
the cost of purchasing survivor benefits.”1005 As for the possibility that dividing the total
retirement pay was a sanction against Charles, the court held that while trial courts have
the authority to sanction through the use of fines, they must identify either the nature of
the sanction or the rule upon which it relied.1006 Because the superior court did neither,
the supreme court vacated the sanction.1007 Remanding the issue of the proper allocation
of Charles’s retirement pay, the supreme court held: (1) courts may not equitably divide
total retirement pay; and (2) when issuing sanctions courts must identify either the nature
of the sanction or the rule upon which they relied to impose the sanction.1008
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NATIVE LAW
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Alaska Supreme Court
Dale H. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services
In Dale H. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,1009 the supreme
court held a father’s parental rights can be terminated under ICWA when he has a history
of abandonment and domestic violence.1010 Dale pled no contest to a fourth degree assault
charge against a woman while she was pregnant.1011 After another incident involving the
newborn, OCS petitioned the superior court to recognize the child as a “child in need of
aid” under the ICWA.1012 The court found probable cause sufficient to award OCS
temporary custody of the child and set forth a case plan for Dale that allowed him to
pursue reunification subject to violence, parenting, and substance abuse counseling.1013 In
the spring of 2009, OCS received three protective services reports involving domestic
incidents between Dale and a new wife and stepson and subsequently moved to terminate
Dale’s parental rights.1014 The superior court terminated Dale’s parental rights, and he
appealed.1015 Citing prior precedent, the supreme court affirmed, stating that Dale’s oneyear abandonment of his child and his “propensity” for domestic violence made
emotional and physical damage to the child if reunited “almost certain.”1016 The court
reaffirmed that the “best interests” standard is related chiefly to the bonds developed
between the child and his foster family, and found that the child was happy and
thriving.1017 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held a father’s parental rights
can be terminated under ICWA when he has a history of abandonment and domestic
violence.1018
Lucy v. State, Department of Health & Social Services
In Lucy v. State, Department of Health & Social Services 1019 the supreme court
held that to terminate parental rights under the Indian Child Welfare (ICWA) and Child
in Need of Aid (CINA) statutes, a court must find by clear and convincing evidence that
the child has been exposed to conditions resulting in mental injury; that the parent failed
to remedy unsuitable conduct; that active efforts were made to prevent the breakup of the
family; that, as established by an expert witness, continued custody by the parent will
result in damage to the child; and finally, that termination of parental rights is in the best
interests of the child.1020 In October 2004, the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took
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custody of Jack and filed an Emergency Petition for Adjudication of Child in Need of
Aid.1021 Lucy sought various forms of treatment for substance abuse until the fall of 2005,
when she relapsed before the birth of her second child.1022 Over the next few years, her
behavior included several incidences of child neglect, continual substance abuse, and
refusal to seek treatment.1023 In 2006, the children were put in foster care.1024 She had a
third child in 2007.1025 Her substance abuse and neglect continued, and in 2009, OCS
terminated Lucy’s parental rights.1026 On appeal, the supreme court found that Lucy did
not remedy her drug and alcohol abuse; that active efforts were made to prevent the break
up of the family; and that terminating Lucy’s rights was in the children’s best
interests.1027 Affirming the trial court, the supreme court held that to terminate parental
rights under ICWA and CINA statutes, a court must find by clear and convincing
evidence that the child has been exposed to conditions resulting in mental injury; that the
parent failed to remedy unsuitable conduct; that active efforts were made to prevent the
breakup of the family; that, as established by an expert witness, continued custody by the
parent will result in damage to the child; and finally, that termination of parental rights is
in the best interests of the child.1028
PROPERTY LAW
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Alaska Supreme Court
Dias v. State, Dep’t of Transportation and Public Facilities
In Dias v. State, Dep’t of Transportation and Public Facilities,1029 the supreme
court held that the state’s easement over private property unambiguously included a right
of passage and the right to construct a road when the easement conveyed a “right of
way.”1030 The state was conveyed an easement over the disputed property in 1969; in
1992, the Diases were conveyed the land subject to the easement.1031 When the state
attempted to negotiate future road construction along the encumbered land, the Diases
filed suit to quiet title, claiming that the easement was solely for mineral removal, not for
road construction.1032 The state moved for summary judgment and the superior court
granted the motion, finding that the state’s right of way easement included road
construction.1033 According to the definition of right of way and past supreme court
decisions, the “right of passage” was unambiguously included in the state’s easement.1034
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Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that the state’s easement over private
property unambiguously included a right of passage and the right to construct a road
when the easement conveyed a “right of way.”1035
State, Department of Natural Resources v. Alaska Riverways, Inc.
In State, Department of Natural Resources v. Alaska Riverways, Inc.,1036 the
supreme court held that the Alaska Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) had
authority to mandate that commercial riparian landowners enter into leases for exclusive
use of state-owned public trust shorelands but that rent amounts in such leases cannot be
based on the number of passengers transported.1037 Alaska Riverways, a tour boat
company, owned property along the Chena River.1038 Alaska Riverways and DNR tried
and failed to agree on terms for a lease.1039 DNR later issued a final decision, stating that
riparian owners “wharfing out” for commercial use had no natural property rights and
that Alaska Riverways must enter into a lease for $1000 per year or $0.25 per paying
customer, whichever was greater.1040 Alaska Riverways appealed, claiming both that the
lease structure discriminated against commercial users and that the fee structure violated
federal law.1041 Although the superior court held that DNR had no authority to bind
Alaska Riverways to any lease, such a lease structure would not violate Alaska
Riverways’ equal protection rights or federal law.1042 The supreme court held that the
public trust doctrine does not itself require riparian owners to sign leases with the
government but that the legislature had created such authority independently.1043 The
court held that DNR was permitted to require Alaska Railways to sign a lease and that
such a lease did not violate equal protection rights.1044 However, court held the $0.25 per
passenger component of the lease agreement unconstitutional.1045 Federal law requires
that states levy fees directly proportional to the benefit provided by the state.1046 Since the
value of the state’s service was the same regardless of how many passengers boarded, the
lease fee was set at $1000.1047 The supreme court held that DNR had the authority to bind
riparian landowners to leases but that the choice of lease fees based on passenger counts
violated federal law.1048
Williams v. Fagnani
In Williams v. Fagnani,1049 the supreme court held that owners of servient estates
may not maintain a gate obstructing the dominant owners’ implied easements unless the
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benefit to the servient estate outweighs the inconveniences to the dominant estate.1050 The
superior court held that Fagnani was entitled to maintain a locked gate that limited access
to the roadway because the easement only provided for private use.1051 The supreme court
reasoned that a locked gate imposes a significant burden on a homeowner’s right to
access his or her property.1052 Therefore, locked gates would only be allowed where the
locked gate provides a substantial benefit to the servient estate, such as providing
security.1053 In situations where both benefit to the servient estate and detriment to the
dominant estate are present, the two must be weighed against one another.1054 Vacating
and remanding, the supreme court held that owners of servient estates may not maintain a
gate obstructing the dominant owners’ implied easements unless the benefit to the
servient estate outweighs the inconveniences to the dominant estate.1055
TORT LAW
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Alaska Supreme Court
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dooley
In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dooley,1056 the supreme court held that the tort of spoliation
is not appropriate when evidence is concealed but not destroyed, and instead the newly
recognized tort of fraudulent concealment of evidence is the proper cause of action.1057
After a slip and fall trial, Dooley discovered that Allstate failed to produce a material
piece of evidence and sued Allstate for spoliation of evidence and fraud and
misrepresentation.1058 On partial summary judgment for the spoliation claim, the supreme
court held that spoliation is not the proper tort when evidence is concealed but not
destroyed.1059 Spoliation is a remedy if evidence is completely inaccessible and any
damage calculation would be speculative, but evidence that is not destroyed can still be
submitted to a fact-finder.1060 Instead, the proper claim should be under a newly
recognized tort in Alaska, fraudulent concealment of evidence, which applies when: (1)
the defendant concealed material evidence; (2) the plaintiff's cause of action was viable;
(3) the evidence could not reasonably have been procured from another source; (4) the
defendant concealed the evidence with the intent to disrupt or prevent litigation; (5) the
withholding damaged the plaintiff from having to rely on an incomplete evidentiary
record; and (6) the plaintiff had no available remedy when the evidence was
discovered.1061 Remanding for further proceedings, the supreme court held that the tort of
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spoliation is not appropriate when evidence is concealed but not destroyed, and instead
the tort of fraudulent concealment of evidence is the proper cause of action.1062
Christoffersen v. State
In Christoffersen v. State,1063 the supreme court held that court-appointed child
custody investigators retain “absolute quasi-judicial immunity,” which also extends to the
state, that shields them from civil lawsuits resulting from the performance of their
duties.1064 A court-appointed investigator did not immediately notify the Christoffersens
that their minor son had previously been accused of inappropriately touching a minor
child.1065 After receiving the custody report that included the information about the
inappropriate touching, the Christoffersens learned that the son had “sexually abused”
their daughter and sued the state, claiming that the investigator failed in her duty to
protect children from abuse and immediately report any sexual abuse that she
discovered.1066 The superior court granted both of the state’s motions for summary
judgment, holding that “custody investigators are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial
immunity” from tort suits related to their official duties, and that the custody investigator
in this case had no duty to warn the Christoffersens.1067 The supreme court affirmed the
superior court’s disposition of the immunity issue without reaching the duty to warn.1068
The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity extends to court-appointed experts and to
others whose duties are “sufficiently related to the judicial process,” including custody
investigators.1069 Finally, the court held that the state was not vicariously liable for these
experts because “a government employee’s official immunity from suit bars vicarious
liability claims against the government for the same conduct.”1070 Affirming the lower
court, the supreme court held that court-appointed child custody investigators retain
“absolute quasi-judicial immunity,” which also extends to the state, that shields them
from civil lawsuits resulting from the performance of their duties.1071
Lindsey v. E&E Automotive & Tire Service, Inc.
In Lindsey v. E&E Automotive & Tire Service, Inc.,1072 the supreme court held
that a plaintiff’s negligence claim against a mechanic does not withstand a motion for
summary judgment when the mechanic fulfilled the duty to: (1) not “increase the risk of
harm” during vehicle repairs; (2) not induce reliance on a vehicle that is unsafe; and (3)
warn the vehicle owner of dangers the mechanic knows, or should have known, result
from any unrepaired aspects of the vehicle.1073 Lindsey was injured when a truck rolled
backwards over him due to a parking brake failure.1074 The truck had previously been
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sent to E&E Automotive to repair its brakes.1075 The mechanic who worked on the truck
did not know how to fix the parking brake and told the owner that it still did not work.1076
Nonetheless, the owner put the truck back in service.1077 Lindsey sued E&E for
negligence, and E&E moved for summary judgment.1078 The superior court found that a
mechanic’s duty of care is to inform a vehicle owner that a vehicle is still impaired or that
a repair has not been made.1079 Because it was not disputed that the mechanic told the
owner that the brake still did not work, the court granted the motion for summary
judgment.1080 On appeal, the supreme court found that E&E did not negligently make the
truck more dangerous, did not induce the owner’s reliance on the truck, and did warn him
that the truck was not repaired.1081 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that
a plaintiff’s negligence claim against a mechanic does not withstand a motion for
summary judgment when the mechanic fulfilled the duty to: (1) not “increase the risk of
harm” during vehicle repairs; (2) not induce reliance on a vehicle that is unsafe; and (3)
warn the vehicle owner of dangers the mechanic knows, or should have known, result
from any unrepaired aspects of the vehicle.1082
Mueller v. Buscemi
In Mueller v. Buscemi,1083 the supreme court held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion when excluding evidence alleging (1) inadequate maintenance; (2)
substantially similar events; and (3) habitual practice.1084 Mueller slipped on ice and hurt
herself in Buscemi’s parking lot.1085 She sued Buscemi arguing that Buscemi’s failure to
remove ice and provide lighting in the lot proximately caused Mueller’s injuries.1086 At
trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Buscemi.1087 Mueller appealed, arguing that
the trial court incorrectly excluded evidence.1088 The supreme court affirmed,1089 holding
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded evidence of inadequate
maintenance. Mueller failed to offer proof as to the substance of the evidence both during
pretrial motions, and at trial.1090 Additionally, the supreme court reasoned that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when excluding proffered evidence of substantially
similar accidents because Mueller failed to overcome the burden of substantial
similarity.1091 Finally, the supreme court reasoned that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when excluding evidence of habitual failed maintenance because the
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photographs Mueller provided were not dated and were thus insufficient to support an
inference of habit.1092 Affirming the trial court, the supreme court found the lower court
did not abuse its discretion when it excluded evidence alleging (1) inadequate
maintenance; (2) substantially similar events; and (3) habitual practice.1093
Smith v. Radecki
In Smith v. Radecki,1094 the supreme court held that a physician performing an
independent medical examination is not liable for medical malpractice because he does
not have a physician-patient relationship with the examinee.1095 Smith injured his back
and filed a workers’ compensation claim, prompting his employer to arrange for Radecki
to conduct an independent medical examination.1096 Prior to the examination, Smith was
informed that no physician-patient relationship would develop as a result of the
examination.1097 Radecki did not discover several spinal injuries during this examination,
causing Smith to file suit.1098 The superior court decided Radecki’s summary judgment
motion in his favor and Smith appealed.1099 The supreme court reasoned that a physician
that conducts an independent medical examination arranged by an employer does not owe
the examinee the duty of care that accompanies a traditional physician-patient
relationship.1100 The court also refused to extend a limited duty of care to Radecki’s
actions because that limited duty was not implicated in Smith’s case.1101 Thus, the
supreme court held that a physician performing an independent medical examination is
not liable for medical malpractice because he does not have a physician-patient
relationship with the examinee.1102
Weed v. Bachner Co. Inc.
In Weed v. Bachner Co. Inc.,1103 the supreme court held that state procurement
officials are only entitled to qualified immunity when defending against common law
claims arising out of bid evaluation processes.1104 Bachner was not awarded a state
contract and sued the procurement officials as individuals, alleging that they had
intentionally interfered with Bachner’s prospective economic opportunity.1105 The
officials moved to dismiss the claim on the basis of absolute immunity.1106 The superior
court denied the motion and held that the procurement officials only had qualified
immunity.1107 The supreme court affirmed, applying a three factor test.1108 The first
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factor, the nature and importance of the officials’ function to the administration of
government, weighed in favor of qualified immunity.1109 The second factor, the
likelihood that the officials will face frequent litigation and the difficulty of defending
themselves, also weighed in favor of qualified immunity.1110 The final factor, the
availability of alternative remedies to the bidders, weighed in favor of absolute
immunity.1111 The supreme court affirmed the superior court and held that state
procurement officials are only entitled to qualified immunity when defending against
common law claims arising out of the bid evaluation process.1112
TRUSTS & ESTATES LAW
top
Alaska Supreme Court
Farmer v. Farmer
In Farmer v. Farmer,1113 the supreme court held that the superior court did not
abuse its discretion by appointing a temporary limited conservator for a person who
demonstrated an inability to manage his property and finances.1114 A probate master
found Robert Farmer was “incapacitated” because he could not manage his finances and
appointed his daughter Barbara as partial limited conservator.1115 The superior court
conducted a hearing de novo and approved the probate master’s findings.1116 Robert
appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support a conservator
appointment.1117 Applying a clearly erroneous standard of review, the supreme court held
that the superior court’s factual findings supported the conclusion that Robert was unable
to manage his property and affairs.1118 The supreme court noted that “incapacity”
necessitating a conservator, under § 13.26.165(2)(A) of the Alaska Statutes, is different
from “incapacity” necessitating guardianship; establishing “incapacity” necessitating a
conservator focuses on the individual’s ability to manage his property and affairs.1119 The
superior court found that Robert was unable to prioritize his finances.1120 The supreme
court held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion by appointing a temporary
limited conservator for a person who demonstrated an inability to manage his property
and finances.1121
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